Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-HVVG-V8HJ-GPV8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-18 18:31

Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

dax/fsdev: use __va(phys) for kaddr in direct_access

Use __va(phys) instead of virt_addr + linear_offset for the kaddr return in __fsdev_dax_direct_access(). The previous code added a device-linear byte offset to virt_addr (which is __va of ranges[0]), but for multi-range devices with physical gaps between ranges, this linear arithmetic crosses the gap and produces a wrong kernel virtual address. Using __va(phys) where phys comes from dax_pgoff_to_phys() is correct for any range layout because the direct map translates each physical address independently.

This leaves dev_dax->virt_addr write-only, so remove the field (suggested by Dave Jiang).

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-93074"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:18:01Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndax/fsdev: use __va(phys) for kaddr in direct_access\n\nUse __va(phys) instead of virt_addr + linear_offset for the kaddr\nreturn in __fsdev_dax_direct_access(). The previous code added a\ndevice-linear byte offset to virt_addr (which is __va of ranges[0]),\nbut for multi-range devices with physical gaps between ranges, this\nlinear arithmetic crosses the gap and produces a wrong kernel virtual\naddress. Using __va(phys) where phys comes from dax_pgoff_to_phys()\nis correct for any range layout because the direct map translates\neach physical address independently.\n\nThis leaves dev_dax-\u003evirt_addr write-only, so remove the field\n(suggested by Dave Jiang).",
  "id": "GHSA-hvvg-v8hj-gpv8",
  "modified": "2026-09-18T18:31:33Z",
  "published": "2026-09-17T18:32:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93074"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b642bd3d39105eef4d5908970726c5fda291b53"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff7c73fca793bd5c29a15ba735b0886f62f3a840"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-93074 (GCVE-0-2026-93074)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-17 16:10 – Updated: 2026-10-19 09:05

Title

dax/fsdev: use __va(phys) for kaddr in direct_access

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dax/fsdev: use __va(phys) for kaddr in direct_access Use __va(phys) instead of virt_addr + linear_offset for the kaddr return in __fsdev_dax_direct_access(). The previous code added a device-linear byte offset to virt_addr (which is __va of ranges[0]), but for multi-range devices with physical gaps between ranges, this linear arithmetic crosses the gap and produces a wrong kernel virtual address. Using __va(phys) where phys comes from dax_pgoff_to_phys() is correct for any range layout because the direct map translates each physical address independently. This leaves dev_dax->virt_addr write-only, so remove the field (suggested by Dave Jiang).

Severity

7.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Assigner

Linux CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard D 53/100 over 6641 records in the last 180 days details

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b642bd3d39105eef…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff7c73fca793bd5c2…

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
Linux	Linux	Affected: 759455848df0b9ac3acabdbedcdc4a55af67935f , < 7b642bd3d39105eef4d5908970726c5fda291b53 (git) Affected: 759455848df0b9ac3acabdbedcdc4a55af67935f , < ff7c73fca793bd5c29a15ba735b0886f62f3a840 (git)
Linux	Linux	Affected: 7.1 Unaffected: 0 , < 7.1 (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.6 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)

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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/dax/dax-private.h",
            "drivers/dax/fsdev.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "7b642bd3d39105eef4d5908970726c5fda291b53",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "759455848df0b9ac3acabdbedcdc4a55af67935f",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "ff7c73fca793bd5c29a15ba735b0886f62f3a840",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "759455848df0b9ac3acabdbedcdc4a55af67935f",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/dax/dax-private.h",
            "drivers/dax/fsdev.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7.1"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7.1",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.6",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2.6",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "7.1",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.3",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "7.1",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndax/fsdev: use __va(phys) for kaddr in direct_access\n\nUse __va(phys) instead of virt_addr + linear_offset for the kaddr\nreturn in __fsdev_dax_direct_access(). The previous code added a\ndevice-linear byte offset to virt_addr (which is __va of ranges[0]),\nbut for multi-range devices with physical gaps between ranges, this\nlinear arithmetic crosses the gap and produces a wrong kernel virtual\naddress. Using __va(phys) where phys comes from dax_pgoff_to_phys()\nis correct for any range layout because the direct map translates\neach physical address independently.\n\nThis leaves dev_dax-\u003evirt_addr write-only, so remove the field\n(suggested by Dave Jiang)."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - The wrong kaddr is computed in __fsdev_dax_direct_access() from a device pgoff supplied by dax_iomap_pgoff() during local VFS DAX I/O (dax_iomap_rw, dax_zero_iter, dax_fault_iter). No network protocol carries that pgoff.\nAC:L - Once a gapped multi-range fsdev_dax device is bound, any I/O whose pgoff dax_pgoff_to_phys() places in a later range makes virt_addr+offset a deterministic wrong linear-map address; the attacker chooses the file offset that yields that pgoff, with no race.\nPR:L - dax_match_type() never auto-binds DAXDRV_FSDEV_TYPE (admin new_id) and fs_dax_get() is the mount-time holder, but dax_direct_access() then has no capability check, so an unprivileged user with file access on the mounted FS-DAX tree reaches the bad kaddr via read/write/fallocate.\nUI:N - The attacker triggers the bad kaddr solely by their own read, write, fallocate, or page-fault on files they can already open; this is not attacker-supplied media that a victim must mount.\nS:U - dax_copy_from_iter(), dax_copy_to_iter(), and fsdev_write_dax() use the wrong host-kernel __va() pointer; impact stays in the host kernel and does not cross a KVM, IOMMU, or other VM-escape boundary.\nC:H - dax_iomap_iter() calls dax_copy_to_iter() from virt_addr+offset, which for a later range is __va of the physical gap (another dax mapping in the same region, or System RAM), so a file read discloses that memory.\nI:H - dax_copy_from_iter() and fsdev_dax_zero_page_range()\u0027s fsdev_write_dax() write attacker bytes or PAGE_SIZE zeros through the same wrong kaddr into the gap, giving a kernel write into adjacent DAX or RAM.\nA:H - memcpy_flushcache() or copy through a kaddr that lands in an unmapped gap oopses the kernel; even a successful wrong-address write can panic by corrupting adjacent structures."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T09:05:10.055Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b642bd3d39105eef4d5908970726c5fda291b53"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff7c73fca793bd5c29a15ba735b0886f62f3a840"
        }
      ],
      "title": "dax/fsdev: use __va(phys) for kaddr in direct_access",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-93074",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-17T16:10:57.051Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-17T15:57:05.661Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T09:05:10.055Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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