GHSA-HV6F-P3FQ-464P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-05 15:30 – Updated: 2025-11-10 18:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: consider that tail calls invalidate packet pointers

Tail-called programs could execute any of the helpers that invalidate packet pointers. Hence, conservatively assume that each tail call invalidates packet pointers.

Making the change in bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data() automatically makes use of check_cfg() logic that computes 'changes_pkt_data' effect for global sub-programs, such that the following program could be rejected:

int tail_call(struct __sk_buff *sk)
{
    bpf_tail_call_static(sk, &jmp_table, 0);
    return 0;
}

SEC("tc")
int not_safe(struct __sk_buff *sk)
{
    int *p = (void *)(long)sk->data;
    ... make p valid ...
    tail_call(sk);
    *p = 42; /* this is unsafe */
    ...
}

The tc_bpf2bpf.c:subprog_tc() needs change: mark it as a function that can invalidate packet pointers. Otherwise, it can't be freplaced with tailcall_freplace.c:entry_freplace() that does a tail call.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-58237"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-476"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-05T15:15:54Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: consider that tail calls invalidate packet pointers\n\nTail-called programs could execute any of the helpers that invalidate\npacket pointers. Hence, conservatively assume that each tail call\ninvalidates packet pointers.\n\nMaking the change in bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data() automatically makes\nuse of check_cfg() logic that computes \u0027changes_pkt_data\u0027 effect for\nglobal sub-programs, such that the following program could be\nrejected:\n\n    int tail_call(struct __sk_buff *sk)\n    {\n    \tbpf_tail_call_static(sk, \u0026jmp_table, 0);\n    \treturn 0;\n    }\n\n    SEC(\"tc\")\n    int not_safe(struct __sk_buff *sk)\n    {\n    \tint *p = (void *)(long)sk-\u003edata;\n    \t... make p valid ...\n    \ttail_call(sk);\n    \t*p = 42; /* this is unsafe */\n    \t...\n    }\n\nThe tc_bpf2bpf.c:subprog_tc() needs change: mark it as a function that\ncan invalidate packet pointers. Otherwise, it can\u0027t be freplaced with\ntailcall_freplace.c:entry_freplace() that does a tail call.",
  "id": "GHSA-hv6f-p3fq-464p",
  "modified": "2025-11-10T18:30:30Z",
  "published": "2025-05-05T15:30:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-58237"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1a4607ffba35bf2a630aab299e34dd3f6e658d70"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c2244437f9ad3dd91215f920401a14f2542dbfc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f1692ee23dcaaddc24ba407b269707ee5df1301f"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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