Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-HV3G-87GW-4M9V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-11 21:31

Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

NFS: fix delegation_hash_table leak when nfs4_server_common_setup() fails

nfs4_server_common_setup() allocates server->delegation_hash_table first, but server->destroy - the only path that frees the table via nfs4_destroy_server() - is not assigned until the very end of the function. If any intermediate step fails (the is_ds_only_client() check, nfs4_init_session(), nfs4_get_rootfh(), or nfs_probe_server()), the function returns with server->destroy still NULL, so the caller's nfs_free_server() skips the destroy callback and the hash table is leaked (4 KiB per attempt with the default delegation watermark).

This is trivially reachable from userspace: every failed NFSv4 mount leaks one allocation. A client that persistently retries a mount that cannot succeed leaks kernel memory without bound. Observed in production where a Longhorn backup poller retried mount.nfs4 against an NFSv3-only server roughly 10 times per second, leaking ~3.4 GiB of unreclaimable slab (kmalloc-rnd-13-4k) per day; the node accumulated 12 GiB of leaked slab before the source was identified via the kmem:kmalloc tracepoint (call_site=nfs4_delegation_hash_alloc).

Reproducer:

# server exports NFSv3 only (or export path absent for v4) while :; do mount -t nfs4 :/missing /mnt; done # watch SUnreclaim in /proc/meminfo grow 4 KiB per iteration

Free the table on the error paths between the allocation and the assignment of server->destroy.

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-89714"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:58Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nNFS: fix delegation_hash_table leak when nfs4_server_common_setup() fails\n\nnfs4_server_common_setup() allocates server-\u003edelegation_hash_table\nfirst, but server-\u003edestroy - the only path that frees the table via\nnfs4_destroy_server() - is not assigned until the very end of the\nfunction. If any intermediate step fails (the is_ds_only_client()\ncheck, nfs4_init_session(), nfs4_get_rootfh(), or nfs_probe_server()),\nthe function returns with server-\u003edestroy still NULL, so the caller\u0027s\nnfs_free_server() skips the destroy callback and the hash table is\nleaked (4 KiB per attempt with the default delegation watermark).\n\nThis is trivially reachable from userspace: every failed NFSv4 mount\nleaks one allocation. A client that persistently retries a mount that\ncannot succeed leaks kernel memory without bound. Observed in\nproduction where a Longhorn backup poller retried mount.nfs4 against\nan NFSv3-only server roughly 10 times per second, leaking ~3.4 GiB of\nunreclaimable slab (kmalloc-rnd-13-4k) per day; the node accumulated\n12 GiB of leaked slab before the source was identified via the\nkmem:kmalloc tracepoint (call_site=nfs4_delegation_hash_alloc).\n\nReproducer:\n\n  # server exports NFSv3 only (or export path absent for v4)\n  while :; do mount -t nfs4 \u003cserver\u003e:/missing /mnt; done\n  # watch SUnreclaim in /proc/meminfo grow 4 KiB per iteration\n\nFree the table on the error paths between the allocation and the\nassignment of server-\u003edestroy.",
  "id": "GHSA-hv3g-87gw-4m9v",
  "modified": "2026-09-11T21:31:37Z",
  "published": "2026-09-11T21:31:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89714"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fd2b9687dae36be5b84eab39b4c627bb7ab33b3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2092f5b38f88be306140c77aeeeb43fc1adacacc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3adf1643517357221422c05986d6de5df7b9913"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

CVE-2026-89714 (GCVE-0-2026-89714)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-11 19:46 – Updated: 2026-10-19 08:51

Title

NFS: fix delegation_hash_table leak when nfs4_server_common_setup() fails

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFS: fix delegation_hash_table leak when nfs4_server_common_setup() fails nfs4_server_common_setup() allocates server->delegation_hash_table first, but server->destroy - the only path that frees the table via nfs4_destroy_server() - is not assigned until the very end of the function. If any intermediate step fails (the is_ds_only_client() check, nfs4_init_session(), nfs4_get_rootfh(), or nfs_probe_server()), the function returns with server->destroy still NULL, so the caller's nfs_free_server() skips the destroy callback and the hash table is leaked (4 KiB per attempt with the default delegation watermark). This is trivially reachable from userspace: every failed NFSv4 mount leaks one allocation. A client that persistently retries a mount that cannot succeed leaks kernel memory without bound. Observed in production where a Longhorn backup poller retried mount.nfs4 against an NFSv3-only server roughly 10 times per second, leaking ~3.4 GiB of unreclaimable slab (kmalloc-rnd-13-4k) per day; the node accumulated 12 GiB of leaked slab before the source was identified via the kmem:kmalloc tracepoint (call_site=nfs4_delegation_hash_alloc). Reproducer: # server exports NFSv3 only (or export path absent for v4) while :; do mount -t nfs4 <server>:/missing /mnt; done # watch SUnreclaim in /proc/meminfo grow 4 KiB per iteration Free the table on the error paths between the allocation and the assignment of server->destroy.

Severity

No CVSS data available.

Assigner

Linux CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard D 53/100 over 6639 records in the last 180 days details

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3adf164351735722…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fd2b9687dae36be5…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2092f5b38f88be306…

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
Linux	Linux	Affected: f5b3108e6a14418b120a3c38ca589b8d6cf87627 , < f3adf1643517357221422c05986d6de5df7b9913 (git) Affected: f5b3108e6a14418b120a3c38ca589b8d6cf87627 , < 0fd2b9687dae36be5b84eab39b4c627bb7ab33b3 (git) Affected: f5b3108e6a14418b120a3c38ca589b8d6cf87627 , < 2092f5b38f88be306140c77aeeeb43fc1adacacc (git)
Linux	Linux	Affected: 6.17 Unaffected: 0 , < 6.17 (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.50 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.4 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/nfs/nfs4client.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "f3adf1643517357221422c05986d6de5df7b9913",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "f5b3108e6a14418b120a3c38ca589b8d6cf87627",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "0fd2b9687dae36be5b84eab39b4c627bb7ab33b3",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "f5b3108e6a14418b120a3c38ca589b8d6cf87627",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2092f5b38f88be306140c77aeeeb43fc1adacacc",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "f5b3108e6a14418b120a3c38ca589b8d6cf87627",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/nfs/nfs4client.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.17"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.17",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.50",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.4",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.18.50",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.17",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2.4",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.17",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.3",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.17",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nNFS: fix delegation_hash_table leak when nfs4_server_common_setup() fails\n\nnfs4_server_common_setup() allocates server-\u003edelegation_hash_table\nfirst, but server-\u003edestroy - the only path that frees the table via\nnfs4_destroy_server() - is not assigned until the very end of the\nfunction. If any intermediate step fails (the is_ds_only_client()\ncheck, nfs4_init_session(), nfs4_get_rootfh(), or nfs_probe_server()),\nthe function returns with server-\u003edestroy still NULL, so the caller\u0027s\nnfs_free_server() skips the destroy callback and the hash table is\nleaked (4 KiB per attempt with the default delegation watermark).\n\nThis is trivially reachable from userspace: every failed NFSv4 mount\nleaks one allocation. A client that persistently retries a mount that\ncannot succeed leaks kernel memory without bound. Observed in\nproduction where a Longhorn backup poller retried mount.nfs4 against\nan NFSv3-only server roughly 10 times per second, leaking ~3.4 GiB of\nunreclaimable slab (kmalloc-rnd-13-4k) per day; the node accumulated\n12 GiB of leaked slab before the source was identified via the\nkmem:kmalloc tracepoint (call_site=nfs4_delegation_hash_alloc).\n\nReproducer:\n\n  # server exports NFSv3 only (or export path absent for v4)\n  while :; do mount -t nfs4 \u003cserver\u003e:/missing /mnt; done\n  # watch SUnreclaim in /proc/meminfo grow 4 KiB per iteration\n\nFree the table on the error paths between the allocation and the\nassignment of server-\u003edestroy."
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T08:51:27.182Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3adf1643517357221422c05986d6de5df7b9913"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fd2b9687dae36be5b84eab39b4c627bb7ab33b3"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2092f5b38f88be306140c77aeeeb43fc1adacacc"
        }
      ],
      "title": "NFS: fix delegation_hash_table leak when nfs4_server_common_setup() fails",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-89714",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-11T19:46:28.476Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-11T19:38:34.751Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T08:51:27.182Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

Loading timeline…

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted