GHSA-HRMJ-F3F9-PQ8R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-16 06:30 – Updated: 2026-10-16 06:30The Customer Email Verification for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via the alg_wc_ev_verify_email parameter in versions up to, and including, 3.3.0. The vulnerability exists because alg_wc_ev_generate_user_code() generates the per-user activation secret using wp_rand(100) when the plugin's 'Encoding method' is set to 'hashids', producing only ~101 possible values (~7 bits of entropy); the resulting token is a reversible Hashids encoding with no cryptographic MAC, and the unauthenticated verify() handler — hooked to init at PHP_INT_MAX with no nonce check and no rate limiting — accepts and acts on the attacker-controlled ?alg_wc_ev_verify_email= GET parameter directly. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to gain authentication as any unverified WordPress account, including administrator-level accounts, by brute-forcing the trivially small activation code space via a forged verification URL. Exploitation requires that the 'Encoding method' setting be changed to 'hashids' (non-default), that the attacker recover or brute-force the Hashids salt (which defaults to an md5(time()) value set at first initialization), and that the target account's email address remain unverified.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-104745"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-16T04:18:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Customer Email Verification for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via the `alg_wc_ev_verify_email` parameter in versions up to, and including, 3.3.0. The vulnerability exists because `alg_wc_ev_generate_user_code()` generates the per-user activation secret using `wp_rand(100)` when the plugin\u0027s \u0027Encoding method\u0027 is set to \u0027hashids\u0027, producing only ~101 possible values (~7 bits of entropy); the resulting token is a reversible Hashids encoding with no cryptographic MAC, and the unauthenticated `verify()` handler \u2014 hooked to `init` at `PHP_INT_MAX` with no nonce check and no rate limiting \u2014 accepts and acts on the attacker-controlled `?alg_wc_ev_verify_email=` GET parameter directly. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to gain authentication as any unverified WordPress account, including administrator-level accounts, by brute-forcing the trivially small activation code space via a forged verification URL. Exploitation requires that the \u0027Encoding method\u0027 setting be changed to \u0027hashids\u0027 (non-default), that the attacker recover or brute-force the Hashids salt (which defaults to an `md5(time())` value set at first initialization), and that the target account\u0027s email address remain unverified.",
"id": "GHSA-hrmj-f3f9-pq8r",
"modified": "2026-10-16T06:30:23Z",
"published": "2026-10-16T06:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104745"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/emails-verification-for-woocommerce/tags/3.3.0/includes/alg-wc-ev-functions.php#L331"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/emails-verification-for-woocommerce/tags/3.3.0/includes/class-alg-wc-ev-core.php#L1258"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/emails-verification-for-woocommerce/tags/3.3.0/includes/class-alg-wc-ev-core.php#L498"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/emails-verification-for-woocommerce/tags/3.3.0/includes/class-alg-wc-ev-core.php#L784"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3744623%40emails-verification-for-woocommerce\u0026new=3744623%40emails-verification-for-woocommerce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/6df7b3ed-a1e3-4df9-828e-95530661e27a?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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