GHSA-HR85-Q7C6-3J62

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-03 09:30 – Updated: 2025-12-18 21:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: usb: aqc111: fix error handling of usbnet read calls

Syzkaller, courtesy of syzbot, identified an error (see report [1]) in aqc111 driver, caused by incomplete sanitation of usb read calls' results. This problem is quite similar to the one fixed in commit 920a9fa27e78 ("net: asix: add proper error handling of usb read errors").

For instance, usbnet_read_cmd() may read fewer than 'size' bytes, even if the caller expected the full amount, and aqc111_read_cmd() will not check its result properly. As [1] shows, this may lead to MAC address in aqc111_bind() being only partly initialized, triggering KMSAN warnings.

Fix the issue by verifying that the number of bytes read is as expected and not less.

[1] Partial syzbot report: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in is_valid_ether_addr include/linux/etherdevice.h:208 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in usbnet_probe+0x2e57/0x4390 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1830 is_valid_ether_addr include/linux/etherdevice.h:208 [inline] usbnet_probe+0x2e57/0x4390 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1830 usb_probe_interface+0xd01/0x1310 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396 call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:-1 [inline] really_probe+0x4d1/0xd90 drivers/base/dd.c:658 __driver_probe_device+0x268/0x380 drivers/base/dd.c:800 ...

Uninit was stored to memory at: dev_addr_mod+0xb0/0x550 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:582 __dev_addr_set include/linux/netdevice.h:4874 [inline] eth_hw_addr_set include/linux/etherdevice.h:325 [inline] aqc111_bind+0x35f/0x1150 drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c:717 usbnet_probe+0xbe6/0x4390 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1772 usb_probe_interface+0xd01/0x1310 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396 ...

Uninit was stored to memory at: ether_addr_copy include/linux/etherdevice.h:305 [inline] aqc111_read_perm_mac drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c:663 [inline] aqc111_bind+0x794/0x1150 drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c:713 usbnet_probe+0xbe6/0x4390 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1772 usb_probe_interface+0xd01/0x1310 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396 call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:-1 [inline] ...

Local variable buf.i created at: aqc111_read_perm_mac drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c:656 [inline] aqc111_bind+0x221/0x1150 drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c:713 usbnet_probe+0xbe6/0x4390 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1772

Severity
7.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-38153"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-125"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-03T09:15:30Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: usb: aqc111: fix error handling of usbnet read calls\n\nSyzkaller, courtesy of syzbot, identified an error (see report [1]) in\naqc111 driver, caused by incomplete sanitation of usb read calls\u0027\nresults. This problem is quite similar to the one fixed in commit\n920a9fa27e78 (\"net: asix: add proper error handling of usb read errors\").\n\nFor instance, usbnet_read_cmd() may read fewer than \u0027size\u0027 bytes,\neven if the caller expected the full amount, and aqc111_read_cmd()\nwill not check its result properly. As [1] shows, this may lead\nto MAC address in aqc111_bind() being only partly initialized,\ntriggering KMSAN warnings.\n\nFix the issue by verifying that the number of bytes read is\nas expected and not less.\n\n[1] Partial syzbot report:\nBUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in is_valid_ether_addr include/linux/etherdevice.h:208 [inline]\nBUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in usbnet_probe+0x2e57/0x4390 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1830\n is_valid_ether_addr include/linux/etherdevice.h:208 [inline]\n usbnet_probe+0x2e57/0x4390 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1830\n usb_probe_interface+0xd01/0x1310 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396\n call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:-1 [inline]\n really_probe+0x4d1/0xd90 drivers/base/dd.c:658\n __driver_probe_device+0x268/0x380 drivers/base/dd.c:800\n...\n\nUninit was stored to memory at:\n dev_addr_mod+0xb0/0x550 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:582\n __dev_addr_set include/linux/netdevice.h:4874 [inline]\n eth_hw_addr_set include/linux/etherdevice.h:325 [inline]\n aqc111_bind+0x35f/0x1150 drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c:717\n usbnet_probe+0xbe6/0x4390 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1772\n usb_probe_interface+0xd01/0x1310 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396\n...\n\nUninit was stored to memory at:\n ether_addr_copy include/linux/etherdevice.h:305 [inline]\n aqc111_read_perm_mac drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c:663 [inline]\n aqc111_bind+0x794/0x1150 drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c:713\n usbnet_probe+0xbe6/0x4390 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1772\n usb_probe_interface+0xd01/0x1310 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396\n call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:-1 [inline]\n...\n\nLocal variable buf.i created at:\n aqc111_read_perm_mac drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c:656 [inline]\n aqc111_bind+0x221/0x1150 drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c:713\n usbnet_probe+0xbe6/0x4390 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1772",
  "id": "GHSA-hr85-q7c6-3j62",
  "modified": "2025-12-18T21:31:33Z",
  "published": "2025-07-03T09:30:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38153"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11273279012c922f37cfb4dd95d142803fc07b98"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/30a9e834c74e260533b8d0885e3c89f6f32f7993"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/405b0d610745fb5e84fc2961d9b960abb9f3d107"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/60790d287c1a1ced3554d4a87c2f27bf299a932a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7c01863b1c47f040d9674171e77789a423b9b128"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c97655275482ef5384ce0501640630a0fc0f6f4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/acb47a40b5e38be03ef659b7bacdddc592ed73b7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f398d2dfe450ce2c031d10b585448862d74a0501"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00007.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00008.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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