GHSA-HR73-3GPV-HH6Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 20:30 – Updated: 2026-09-17 20:30Summary
Steeltoe's Eureka discovery client deserializes the registry response as a single unit. If any registered instance contains a field value that cannot be parsed (for example, an unrecognized actionType, a non-boolean value for isCoordinatingDiscoveryServer, or a non-numeric timestamp), deserialization of the entire registry fails. All Steeltoe Eureka clients connected to that registry then receive an empty or stale instance list until the malformed registration is removed.
This is a related but distinct issue from CVE-2026-50196, which addressed only the DataCenterInfo.name field.
Impact
Any principal that can register or update a service instance in the Eureka registry can trigger a service-discovery outage for all Steeltoe applications connected to the same registry. The outage persists until the offending registration is removed.
Affected configuration
- Application uses
EurekaDiscoveryClient(any deployment, including self-hosted Eureka). - The registry contains at least one service instance with an unrecognized value in a field such as
actionType,status,isCoordinatingDiscoveryServer, or timestamp fields. - Mixed-platform environments — for example, Java or Spring services co-existing in the same Eureka registry — are more likely to encounter this condition.
Mitigations
If an immediate upgrade is not possible:
- Audit the Eureka registry for registrations containing non-standard field values, particularly those originating from non-.NET clients.
- Restrict write access to the Eureka registration API to trusted services.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Steeltoe.Discovery.Eureka"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81515"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-755"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T20:30:45Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T16:17:46Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nSteeltoe\u0027s Eureka discovery client deserializes the registry response as a single unit. If any registered instance contains a field value that cannot be parsed (for example, an unrecognized `actionType`, a non-boolean value for `isCoordinatingDiscoveryServer`, or a non-numeric timestamp), deserialization of the entire registry fails. All Steeltoe Eureka clients connected to that registry then receive an empty or stale instance list until the malformed registration is removed.\n\nThis is a related but distinct issue from [CVE-2026-50196](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j8ph-6fxj-g533), which addressed only the `DataCenterInfo.name` field.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny principal that can register or update a service instance in the Eureka registry can trigger a service-discovery outage for all Steeltoe applications connected to the same registry. The outage persists until the offending registration is removed.\n\n## Affected configuration\n\n* Application uses `EurekaDiscoveryClient` (any deployment, including self-hosted Eureka).\n* The registry contains at least one service instance with an unrecognized value in a field such as `actionType`, `status`, `isCoordinatingDiscoveryServer`, or timestamp fields.\n* Mixed-platform environments \u2014 for example, Java or Spring services co-existing in the same Eureka registry \u2014 are more likely to encounter this condition.\n\n## Mitigations\n\nIf an immediate upgrade is not possible:\n\n* Audit the Eureka registry for registrations containing non-standard field values, particularly those originating from non-.NET clients.\n* Restrict write access to the Eureka registration API to trusted services.",
"id": "GHSA-hr73-3gpv-hh6q",
"modified": "2026-09-17T20:30:46Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T20:30:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SteeltoeOSS/security-advisories/security/advisories/GHSA-hr73-3gpv-hh6q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81515"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SteeltoeOSS/Steeltoe/commit/bc1c3763aacc1fee82ef9932f338ec08dcb00432"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SteeltoeOSS/Steeltoe/releases/tag/4.3.0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/SteeltoeOSS/security-advisories"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j8ph-6fxj-g533"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Steeltoe.Discovery.Eureka: malformed enum/bool/timestamp field aborts entire registry fetch (DoS)"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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