GHSA-HQMW-J6G2-75M9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-24 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Do cache maintenance on the source VM during intra-host migration
Manually perform cache maintenance on the source VM during intra-host migration to ensure no stale data is left in CPU caches after the VM is destroyed. Because the source VM is "converted" to a non-SEV VM, KVM's memory reclaim flows won't trigger cache maintenance, e.g. when all guest memory is reclaimed in response to detaching from the mmu_notifier.
Note, relying on the destination VM to do cache maintenance isn't an option as KVM doesn't require identical guest memory configurations, i.e. the source VM may have access to memory that the destination VM does not. Enforcing equivalent memory configurations is infeasible, as it would require a deep comparison of memslots, e.g. to verify that not only are the memslot identical, but what the memslots point at is also identical.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98471"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:16:57Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: SEV: Do cache maintenance on the source VM during intra-host migration\n\nManually perform cache maintenance on the source VM during intra-host\nmigration to ensure no stale data is left in CPU caches after the VM is\ndestroyed. Because the source VM is \"converted\" to a non-SEV VM, KVM\u0027s\nmemory reclaim flows won\u0027t trigger cache maintenance, e.g. when all guest\nmemory is reclaimed in response to detaching from the mmu_notifier.\n\nNote, relying on the destination VM to do cache maintenance isn\u0027t an option\nas KVM doesn\u0027t require identical guest memory configurations, i.e. the\nsource VM may have access to memory that the destination VM does not.\nEnforcing equivalent memory configurations is infeasible, as it would\nrequire a *deep* comparison of memslots, e.g. to verify that not only are\nthe memslot identical, but what the memslots point at is also identical.",
"id": "GHSA-hqmw-j6g2-75m9",
"modified": "2026-10-24T15:32:46Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:31:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98471"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37dfb676fafd1eef36fe0bb649607afbb0d5521b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/93de2a6a4b91b72607136dd656edf03fb399d27f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d4cc2dff12116a700add601c0262132cc26e1b2c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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