GHSA-HPWV-QHMC-P3V4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-06 09:31 – Updated: 2026-10-06 09:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wilc1000: fix out-of-bounds read in P2P public action frames
wilc_wfi_p2p_rx() and mgmt_tx() start parsing a frame once ieee80211_is_public_action() returns true. That helper only verifies the frame is long enough for the action category field, that is offsetofend(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u.action.category), 25 bytes. Both functions then read the P2P public action header up to oui_subtype at offset 30 and pass "size - ie_offset" to cfg80211_find_vendor_ie(), where ie_offset is offsetof(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u) + sizeof(*d), i.e. 32.
A public action frame of 25 to 31 bytes passes the check but is shorter than that 32 byte header, so oui_subtype can be read out of bounds, and because the length is unsigned, "size - ie_offset" underflows to a value close to 4 GiB. cfg80211_find_vendor_ie() takes an unsigned int length, so even the size_t subtraction in mgmt_tx() is truncated to the same value. It then walks far past the buffer searching for a vendor element until it reaches unmapped memory.
In the receive path the frame arrives over the air and needs no association, so a nearby unauthenticated device can crash the host while it is in P2P listen. Reject frames shorter than the P2P public action header in both paths before dereferencing it.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98190"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-06T09:18:04Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: wilc1000: fix out-of-bounds read in P2P public action frames\n\nwilc_wfi_p2p_rx() and mgmt_tx() start parsing a frame once\nieee80211_is_public_action() returns true. That helper only verifies the\nframe is long enough for the action category field, that is\noffsetofend(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u.action.category), 25 bytes. Both\nfunctions then read the P2P public action header up to oui_subtype at\noffset 30 and pass \"size - ie_offset\" to cfg80211_find_vendor_ie(), where\nie_offset is offsetof(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u) + sizeof(*d), i.e. 32.\n\nA public action frame of 25 to 31 bytes passes the check but is shorter\nthan that 32 byte header, so oui_subtype can be read out of bounds, and\nbecause the length is unsigned, \"size - ie_offset\" underflows to a value\nclose to 4 GiB. cfg80211_find_vendor_ie() takes an unsigned int length,\nso even the size_t subtraction in mgmt_tx() is truncated to the same\nvalue. It then walks far past the buffer searching for a vendor element\nuntil it reaches unmapped memory.\n\nIn the receive path the frame arrives over the air and needs no\nassociation, so a nearby unauthenticated device can crash the host while\nit is in P2P listen. Reject frames shorter than the P2P public action\nheader in both paths before dereferencing it.",
"id": "GHSA-hpwv-qhmc-p3v4",
"modified": "2026-10-06T09:31:30Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98190"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/491df93b10d76aebaf6aa4bb05a6ba897f4fccfb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/68b786691ce24c5c94e28811db243e573c50f9c1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6fbe76eb2796d2aee45cc6a2dd16e85d3cc96304"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a5b827dad8a3037cef04d0240d1c2acb1557101e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ba6cb7c0868a412c2eb68e8efd5aa38bfb258a14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc2ee642ebeac8699b671ddb6d5955a785e5ff43"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e98ad9f4c59f2e836f8d971b57763a4277680422"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0c46f8111a479b97b8ab17747c528cade6257f1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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