GHSA-HPP4-8VC7-9FH4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-19 09:34 – Updated: 2026-05-12 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: fix possible cp null dereference
cp might be null, calling cp->cp_conn would produce null dereference
[Simon Horman adds:]
Analysis:
-
cp is a parameter of __rds_rdma_map and is not reassigned.
-
The following call-sites pass a NULL cp argument to __rds_rdma_map()
-
rds_get_mr()
-
rds_get_mr_for_dest
-
Prior to the code above, the following assumes that cp may be NULL (which is indicative, but could itself be unnecessary)
trans_private = rs->rs_transport->get_mr( sg, nents, rs, &mr->r_key, cp ? cp->cp_conn : NULL, args->vec.addr, args->vec.bytes, need_odp ? ODP_ZEROBASED : ODP_NOT_NEEDED);
-
The code modified by this patch is guarded by IS_ERR(trans_private), where trans_private is assigned as per the previous point in this analysis.
The only implementation of get_mr that I could locate is rds_ib_get_mr() which can return an ERR_PTR if the conn (4th) argument is NULL.
- ret is set to PTR_ERR(trans_private). rds_ib_get_mr can return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV) if the conn (4th) argument is NULL. Thus ret may be -ENODEV in which case the code in question will execute.
Conclusion: * cp may be NULL at the point where this patch adds a check; this patch does seem to address a possible bug
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-35902"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-19T09:15:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/rds: fix possible cp null dereference\n\ncp might be null, calling cp-\u003ecp_conn would produce null dereference\n\n[Simon Horman adds:]\n\nAnalysis:\n\n* cp is a parameter of __rds_rdma_map and is not reassigned.\n\n* The following call-sites pass a NULL cp argument to __rds_rdma_map()\n\n - rds_get_mr()\n - rds_get_mr_for_dest\n\n* Prior to the code above, the following assumes that cp may be NULL\n (which is indicative, but could itself be unnecessary)\n\n\ttrans_private = rs-\u003ers_transport-\u003eget_mr(\n\t\tsg, nents, rs, \u0026mr-\u003er_key, cp ? cp-\u003ecp_conn : NULL,\n\t\targs-\u003evec.addr, args-\u003evec.bytes,\n\t\tneed_odp ? ODP_ZEROBASED : ODP_NOT_NEEDED);\n\n* The code modified by this patch is guarded by IS_ERR(trans_private),\n where trans_private is assigned as per the previous point in this analysis.\n\n The only implementation of get_mr that I could locate is rds_ib_get_mr()\n which can return an ERR_PTR if the conn (4th) argument is NULL.\n\n* ret is set to PTR_ERR(trans_private).\n rds_ib_get_mr can return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV) if the conn (4th) argument is NULL.\n Thus ret may be -ENODEV in which case the code in question will execute.\n\nConclusion:\n* cp may be NULL at the point where this patch adds a check;\n this patch does seem to address a possible bug",
"id": "GHSA-hpp4-8vc7-9fh4",
"modified": "2026-05-12T12:31:49Z",
"published": "2024-05-19T09:34:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35902"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-265688.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62fc3357e079a07a22465b9b6ef71bb6ea75ee4b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6794090c742008c53b344b35b021d4a3093dc50a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/92309bed3c5fbe2ccd4c45056efd42edbd06162d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bcd46782e2ec3825d10c1552fcb674d491cc09f9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cbaac2e5488ed54833897264a5ffb2a341a9f196"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cfb786b03b03c5ff38882bee38525eb9987e4d14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d275de8ea7be3a453629fddae41d4156762e814c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d49fac38479bfdaec52b3ea274d290c47a294029"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00017.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00020.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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