GHSA-HPJG-565W-PRFP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-01 12:30 – Updated: 2026-01-20 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/rtas_flash: allow user copy to flash block cache objects
With hardened usercopy enabled (CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y), using the /proc/powerpc/rtas/firmware_update interface to prepare a system firmware update yields a BUG():
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 2232 Comm: dd Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #2 Hardware name: IBM,8408-E8E POWER8E (raw) 0x4b0201 0xf000004 of:IBM,FW860.50 (SV860_146) hv:phyp pSeries NIP: c0000000005991d0 LR: c0000000005991cc CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c0000000148c76a0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.5.0-rc3+) MSR: 8000000000029033 CR: 24002242 XER: 0000000c CFAR: c0000000001fbd34 IRQMASK: 0 [ ... GPRs omitted ... ] NIP usercopy_abort+0xa0/0xb0 LR usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xb0 Call Trace: usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xb0 (unreliable) __check_heap_object+0x1b4/0x1d0 __check_object_size+0x2d0/0x380 rtas_flash_write+0xe4/0x250 proc_reg_write+0xfc/0x160 vfs_write+0xfc/0x4e0 ksys_write+0x90/0x160 system_call_exception+0x178/0x320 system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4
The blocks of the firmware image are copied directly from user memory to objects allocated from flash_block_cache, so flash_block_cache must be created using kmem_cache_create_usercopy() to mark it safe for user access.
[mpe: Trim and indent oops]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-53487"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-01T12:15:51Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npowerpc/rtas_flash: allow user copy to flash block cache objects\n\nWith hardened usercopy enabled (CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y), using the\n/proc/powerpc/rtas/firmware_update interface to prepare a system\nfirmware update yields a BUG():\n\n kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!\n Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]\n LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries\n Modules linked in:\n CPU: 0 PID: 2232 Comm: dd Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #2\n Hardware name: IBM,8408-E8E POWER8E (raw) 0x4b0201 0xf000004 of:IBM,FW860.50 (SV860_146) hv:phyp pSeries\n NIP: c0000000005991d0 LR: c0000000005991cc CTR: 0000000000000000\n REGS: c0000000148c76a0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.5.0-rc3+)\n MSR: 8000000000029033 \u003cSF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE\u003e CR: 24002242 XER: 0000000c\n CFAR: c0000000001fbd34 IRQMASK: 0\n [ ... GPRs omitted ... ]\n NIP usercopy_abort+0xa0/0xb0\n LR usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xb0\n Call Trace:\n usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xb0 (unreliable)\n __check_heap_object+0x1b4/0x1d0\n __check_object_size+0x2d0/0x380\n rtas_flash_write+0xe4/0x250\n proc_reg_write+0xfc/0x160\n vfs_write+0xfc/0x4e0\n ksys_write+0x90/0x160\n system_call_exception+0x178/0x320\n system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4\n\nThe blocks of the firmware image are copied directly from user memory\nto objects allocated from flash_block_cache, so flash_block_cache must\nbe created using kmem_cache_create_usercopy() to mark it safe for user\naccess.\n\n[mpe: Trim and indent oops]",
"id": "GHSA-hpjg-565w-prfp",
"modified": "2026-01-20T18:31:52Z",
"published": "2025-10-01T12:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53487"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ba7f969be599e21d4b1f1e947593de6515f4996"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d29e21ed09fa668416fa7721e08d451b9903485"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4f3175979e62de3b929bfa54a0db4b87d36257a7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6acb8a453388374fafb3c3b37534b675b2aa0ae1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ef25fb13494e35c6dbe15445c7875fa92bc3e8b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f09cc15dcd91d16562400c51d24c7be0d5796fa"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b8fee83aa4ed3846c7f50a0b364bc699f48d96e5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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