GHSA-HMFM-F852-MMJ6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 09:31 – Updated: 2026-08-29 09:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ntfs: bound the look-ahead attribute-list entry in ntfs_external_attr_find()

When resolving an attribute lookup with a non-zero @lowest_vcn, ntfs_external_attr_find() peeks at the next $ATTRIBUTE_LIST entry to decide whether to keep searching, but bounds that not-yet-validated entry only with "(u8 )next_al_entry + 6 < al_end" (which proves just bytes 0..6 are in range) and "(u8 )next_al_entry + length <= al_end" with an attacker-controlled, non-8-aligned length. It then reads next_al_entry->lowest_vcn (an __le64 at offset 8) and the name at next_al_entry->name_offset, both of which can lie past al_end -- the exact end of the kvmalloc'd attribute-list buffer (allocated at the on-disk attr_list_size, no rounding). A crafted on-disk $ATTRIBUTE_LIST whose last entry sits a few bytes before al_end therefore yields a slab out-of-bounds read when the inode is read.

Validate the look-ahead entry with ntfs_attr_list_entry_is_valid() (added in patch 1/3) before dereferencing lowest_vcn and the name, so the same fixed-header, length and name bounds the main attribute-list walk uses now guard this read too.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-80673"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-28T08:16:52Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nntfs: bound the look-ahead attribute-list entry in ntfs_external_attr_find()\n\nWhen resolving an attribute lookup with a non-zero @lowest_vcn,\nntfs_external_attr_find() peeks at the next $ATTRIBUTE_LIST entry to\ndecide whether to keep searching, but bounds that not-yet-validated\nentry only with \"(u8 *)next_al_entry + 6 \u003c al_end\" (which proves just\nbytes 0..6 are in range) and \"(u8 *)next_al_entry + length \u003c= al_end\"\nwith an attacker-controlled, non-8-aligned length. It then reads\nnext_al_entry-\u003elowest_vcn (an __le64 at offset 8) and the name at\nnext_al_entry-\u003ename_offset, both of which can lie past al_end -- the\nexact end of the kvmalloc\u0027d attribute-list buffer (allocated at the\non-disk attr_list_size, no rounding). A crafted on-disk $ATTRIBUTE_LIST\nwhose last entry sits a few bytes before al_end therefore yields a slab\nout-of-bounds read when the inode is read.\n\nValidate the look-ahead entry with ntfs_attr_list_entry_is_valid() (added\nin patch 1/3) before dereferencing lowest_vcn and the name, so the same\nfixed-header, length and name bounds the main attribute-list walk uses now\nguard this read too.",
  "id": "GHSA-hmfm-f852-mmj6",
  "modified": "2026-08-29T09:30:27Z",
  "published": "2026-08-28T09:31:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80673"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/344b18f389f9934d59c7b0cf3d20541ea2e0da58"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/44885c9b45eb4082fb7f558590d84bb254a08e94"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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