GHSA-HM8Q-7F3Q-5F36

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-09 00:45 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:35
VLAI?
Summary
Hono has improper validation of NumericDate claims (exp, nbf, iat) in JWT verify()
Details

Summary

Improper validation of the JWT NumericDate claims exp, nbf, and iat in hono/utils/jwt allows tokens with non-spec-compliant claim values to silently bypass time-based checks. This issue is not exploitable by an anonymous attacker; it only manifests when a malformed claim value reaches verify() — typically when the application itself issues such tokens, or when the signing key is otherwise under attacker control.

Details

The validation routine combined option, presence, and threshold checks in a single short-circuiting expression, so several classes of malformed values were silently skipped instead of rejected:

  • A falsy numeric value short-circuited the presence check.
  • A non-finite numeric value compared as never-after-now and never-expired.
  • A non-numeric type produced NaN comparisons that evaluated false.

This deviates from RFC 7519 §4.1.4, which defines NumericDate as a finite JSON numeric value.

Impact

An actor able to issue tokens accepted by the application may craft tokens whose exp, nbf, or iat claims silently bypass time-based enforcement. This may lead to:

  • Tokens treated as never expiring even with exp configured on the verifier.
  • Tokens with a future nbf accepted as currently valid.
  • Tokens with a future iat accepted as legitimately issued.

Deployments using a well-formed token issuer and protecting the signing key are not affected.

Severity ?
3.8 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "hono"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.12.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44459"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-09T00:45:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T16:16:57Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nImproper validation of the JWT NumericDate claims `exp`, `nbf`, and `iat` in `hono/utils/jwt` allows tokens with non-spec-compliant claim values to silently bypass time-based checks. This issue is not exploitable by an anonymous attacker; it only manifests when a malformed claim value reaches `verify()` \u2014 typically when the application itself issues such tokens, or when the signing key is otherwise under attacker control.\n\n### Details\n\nThe validation routine combined option, presence, and threshold checks in a single short-circuiting expression, so several classes of malformed values were silently skipped instead of rejected:\n\n- A falsy numeric value short-circuited the presence check.\n- A non-finite numeric value compared as never-after-now and never-expired.\n- A non-numeric type produced NaN comparisons that evaluated false.\n\nThis deviates from RFC 7519 \u00a74.1.4, which defines NumericDate as a finite JSON numeric value.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn actor able to issue tokens accepted by the application may craft tokens whose `exp`, `nbf`, or `iat` claims silently bypass time-based enforcement. This may lead to:\n\n- Tokens treated as never expiring even with `exp` configured on the verifier.\n- Tokens with a future `nbf` accepted as currently valid.\n- Tokens with a future `iat` accepted as legitimately issued.\n\nDeployments using a well-formed token issuer and protecting the signing key are not affected.",
  "id": "GHSA-hm8q-7f3q-5f36",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T20:35:44Z",
  "published": "2026-05-09T00:45:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-hm8q-7f3q-5f36"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44459"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Hono has improper validation of NumericDate claims (exp, nbf, iat) in JWT verify()"
}


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