GHSA-HM8J-9QJW-G376
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-29 03:31 – Updated: 2025-11-04 00:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: Fix multiple init when debugfs is disabled
If bt_debugfs is not created successfully, which happens if either CONFIG_DEBUG_FS or CONFIG_DEBUG_FS_ALLOW_ALL is unset, then iso_init() returns early and does not set iso_inited to true. This means that a subsequent call to iso_init() will result in duplicate calls to proto_register(), bt_sock_register(), etc.
With CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED and CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION enabled, the duplicate call to proto_register() triggers this BUG():
list_add double add: new=ffffffffc0b280d0, prev=ffffffffbab56250, next=ffffffffc0b280d0. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:35! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 2 PID: 887 Comm: bluetoothd Not tainted 6.10.11-1-ao-desktop #1 RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x9a/0xa0 ... __list_add_valid_or_report+0x9a/0xa0 proto_register+0x2b5/0x340 iso_init+0x23/0x150 [bluetooth] set_iso_socket_func+0x68/0x1b0 [bluetooth] kmem_cache_free+0x308/0x330 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x990/0x9e0 [bluetooth] __sock_sendmsg+0x7b/0x80 sock_write_iter+0x9a/0x110 do_iter_readv_writev+0x11d/0x220 vfs_writev+0x180/0x3e0 do_writev+0xca/0x100 ...
This change removes the early return. The check for iso_debugfs being NULL was unnecessary, it is always NULL when iso_inited is false.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-50077"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-29T01:15:04Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: ISO: Fix multiple init when debugfs is disabled\n\nIf bt_debugfs is not created successfully, which happens if either\nCONFIG_DEBUG_FS or CONFIG_DEBUG_FS_ALLOW_ALL is unset, then iso_init()\nreturns early and does not set iso_inited to true. This means that a\nsubsequent call to iso_init() will result in duplicate calls to\nproto_register(), bt_sock_register(), etc.\n\nWith CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED and CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION enabled, the\nduplicate call to proto_register() triggers this BUG():\n\n list_add double add: new=ffffffffc0b280d0, prev=ffffffffbab56250,\n next=ffffffffc0b280d0.\n ------------[ cut here ]------------\n kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:35!\n Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI\n CPU: 2 PID: 887 Comm: bluetoothd Not tainted 6.10.11-1-ao-desktop #1\n RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x9a/0xa0\n ...\n __list_add_valid_or_report+0x9a/0xa0\n proto_register+0x2b5/0x340\n iso_init+0x23/0x150 [bluetooth]\n set_iso_socket_func+0x68/0x1b0 [bluetooth]\n kmem_cache_free+0x308/0x330\n hci_sock_sendmsg+0x990/0x9e0 [bluetooth]\n __sock_sendmsg+0x7b/0x80\n sock_write_iter+0x9a/0x110\n do_iter_readv_writev+0x11d/0x220\n vfs_writev+0x180/0x3e0\n do_writev+0xca/0x100\n ...\n\nThis change removes the early return. The check for iso_debugfs being\nNULL was unnecessary, it is always NULL when iso_inited is false.",
"id": "GHSA-hm8j-9qjw-g376",
"modified": "2025-11-04T00:31:51Z",
"published": "2024-10-29T03:31:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50077"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8fb8e912afb4c47dec12ea9a5853e7a8db95816f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a9b7b535ba192c6b77e6c15a4c82d853163eab8c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/adf1b179c2ff8073c24bf87e5a605fcc5a09798b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa4b832c5a6ec35023a1b997cf658c436619c752"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/01/msg00001.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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