GHSA-HM85-CQWX-6V52
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-01 06:31 – Updated: 2026-05-12 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tun: limit printing rate when illegal packet received by tun dev
vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents. When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump packet and soft lockup will be detected.
net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate.
PID: 33036 TASK: ffff949da6f20000 CPU: 23 COMMAND: "vhost-32980" #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663 [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20] RIP: ffffffff89792594 RSP: ffffa655314979e8 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: ffffffff89792500 RBX: ffffffff8af428a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000000003fd RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffffff8af428a0 RBP: 0000000000002710 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 000000000000000f R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8acbf64f R12: 0000000000000020 R13: ffffffff8acbf698 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun] #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun] #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net] #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost] #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-27013"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-01T06:15:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntun: limit printing rate when illegal packet received by tun dev\n\nvhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many\nillegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents.\nWhen console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump\npacket and soft lockup will be detected.\n\nnet_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate.\n\nPID: 33036 TASK: ffff949da6f20000 CPU: 23 COMMAND: \"vhost-32980\"\n #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253\n #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3\n #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e\n #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d\n #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663\n [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20]\n RIP: ffffffff89792594 RSP: ffffa655314979e8 RFLAGS: 00000002\n RAX: ffffffff89792500 RBX: ffffffff8af428a0 RCX: 0000000000000000\n RDX: 00000000000003fd RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffffff8af428a0\n RBP: 0000000000002710 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 000000000000000f\n R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8acbf64f R12: 0000000000000020\n R13: ffffffff8acbf698 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 0000000000000000\n ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018\n #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594\n #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470\n #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6\n #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605\n #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558\n #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124\n #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07\n #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306\n #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765\n #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun]\n #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun]\n #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net]\n #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost]\n #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72\n #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f",
"id": "GHSA-hm85-cqwx-6v52",
"modified": "2026-05-12T12:31:44Z",
"published": "2024-05-01T06:31:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27013"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-265688.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-613116.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/14cdb43dbc827e18ac7d5b30c5b4c676219f1421"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/40f4ced305c6c47487d3cd8da54676e2acc1a6ad"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4b0dcae5c4797bf31c63011ed62917210d3fdac3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/52854101180beccdb9dc2077a3bea31b6ad48dfa"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62e27ef18eb4f0d33bbae8e9ef56b99696a74713"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/68459b8e3ee554ce71878af9eb69659b9462c588"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a50dbeca28acf7051dfa92786b85f704c75db6eb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8bbc07ac535593139c875ffa19af924b1084540"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00017.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00020.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/4EZ6PJW7VOZ224TD7N4JZNU6KV32ZJ53"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/DAMSOZXJEPUOXW33WZYWCVAY7Z5S7OOY"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/GCBZZEC7L7KTWWAS2NLJK6SO3IZIL4WW"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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