GHSA-HM7R-C7QW-GHP6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-03 22:01 – Updated: 2026-04-06 23:41
VLAI?
Summary
fast-jwt accepts unknown `crit` header extensions (RFC 7515 violation)
Details
Summary
fast-jwt does not validate the crit (Critical) Header Parameter defined in RFC 7515 §4.1.11. When a JWS token contains a crit array listing extensions that fast-jwt does not understand, the library accepts the token instead of rejecting it. This violates the MUST requirement in the RFC.
RFC Requirement
RFC 7515 §4.1.11:
If any of the listed extension Header Parameters are not understood and supported by the recipient, then the JWS is invalid.
Proof of Concept
const { createSigner, createVerifier } = require("fast-jwt"); // v3.3.3
const signer = createSigner({ key: "secret", algorithm: "HS256" });
const token = signer({
sub: "attacker",
role: "admin",
header: { crit: ["x-custom-policy"], "x-custom-policy": "require-mfa" },
});
// Should REJECT — x-custom-policy is not understood
const verifier = createVerifier({ key: "secret", algorithms: ["HS256"] });
try {
const result = verifier(token);
console.log("ACCEPTED:", result);
// Output: ACCEPTED: { sub: 'attacker', role: 'admin' }
} catch (e) {
console.log("REJECTED:", e.message);
}
Expected: Error — unsupported critical extension Actual: Token accepted.
Comparison
// jose (panva) v4+ — correctly rejects
const jose = require("jose");
await jose.jwtVerify(token, new TextEncoder().encode("secret"));
// throws: Extension Header Parameter "x-custom-policy" is not recognized
Impact
- Split-brain verification in mixed-library environments
- Security policy bypass when
critcarries enforcement semantics - Token binding bypass (RFC 7800
cnfconfirmation) - See CVE-2025-59420 for full impact analysis
Suggested Fix
In src/verifier.js, add crit validation after header decoding:
const SUPPORTED_CRIT = new Set(["b64"]);
function validateCrit(header) {
if (!header.crit) return;
if (!Array.isArray(header.crit) || header.crit.length === 0)
throw new Error("crit must be a non-empty array");
for (const ext of header.crit) {
if (!SUPPORTED_CRIT.has(ext))
throw new Error(`Unsupported critical extension: ${ext}`);
if (!(ext in header))
throw new Error(`Critical extension ${ext} not present in header`);
}
}
Severity ?
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "fast-jwt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "6.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35042"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-636"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T22:01:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T17:17:13Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`fast-jwt` does not validate the `crit` (Critical) Header Parameter defined in RFC 7515 \u00a74.1.11. When a JWS token contains a `crit` array listing extensions that `fast-jwt` does not understand, the library accepts the token instead of rejecting it. This violates the **MUST** requirement in the RFC.\n\n---\n\n## RFC Requirement\n\nRFC 7515 \u00a74.1.11:\n\n\u003e If any of the listed extension Header Parameters are **not understood\n\u003e and supported** by the recipient, then the **JWS is invalid**.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```javascript\nconst { createSigner, createVerifier } = require(\"fast-jwt\"); // v3.3.3\n\nconst signer = createSigner({ key: \"secret\", algorithm: \"HS256\" });\nconst token = signer({\n sub: \"attacker\",\n role: \"admin\",\n header: { crit: [\"x-custom-policy\"], \"x-custom-policy\": \"require-mfa\" },\n});\n\n// Should REJECT \u2014 x-custom-policy is not understood\nconst verifier = createVerifier({ key: \"secret\", algorithms: [\"HS256\"] });\ntry {\n const result = verifier(token);\n console.log(\"ACCEPTED:\", result);\n // Output: ACCEPTED: { sub: \u0027attacker\u0027, role: \u0027admin\u0027 }\n} catch (e) {\n console.log(\"REJECTED:\", e.message);\n}\n```\n\n**Expected:** Error \u2014 unsupported critical extension\n**Actual:** Token accepted.\n\n### Comparison\n\n```javascript\n// jose (panva) v4+ \u2014 correctly rejects\nconst jose = require(\"jose\");\nawait jose.jwtVerify(token, new TextEncoder().encode(\"secret\"));\n// throws: Extension Header Parameter \"x-custom-policy\" is not recognized\n```\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Split-brain verification** in mixed-library environments\n- **Security policy bypass** when `crit` carries enforcement semantics\n- **Token binding bypass** (RFC 7800 `cnf` confirmation)\n- See CVE-2025-59420 for full impact analysis\n\n---\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nIn `src/verifier.js`, add crit validation after header decoding:\n\n```javascript\nconst SUPPORTED_CRIT = new Set([\"b64\"]);\n\nfunction validateCrit(header) {\n if (!header.crit) return;\n if (!Array.isArray(header.crit) || header.crit.length === 0)\n throw new Error(\"crit must be a non-empty array\");\n for (const ext of header.crit) {\n if (!SUPPORTED_CRIT.has(ext))\n throw new Error(`Unsupported critical extension: ${ext}`);\n if (!(ext in header))\n throw new Error(`Critical extension ${ext} not present in header`);\n }\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-hm7r-c7qw-ghp6",
"modified": "2026-04-06T23:41:50Z",
"published": "2026-04-03T22:01:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/security/advisories/GHSA-hm7r-c7qw-ghp6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35042"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9ggr-2464-2j32"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515.html#section-4.1.11"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "fast-jwt accepts unknown `crit` header extensions (RFC 7515 violation)"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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