GHSA-HJ85-PH9Q-78JG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 16:20 – Updated: 2026-06-05 16:20Summary
The shared form-view submit handler in NocoDB writes the form's redirect_url to window.location.href after a same-host check that does not validate the URL scheme. A user with editor role (or above) on any base can plant a javascript: URL in the form's redirect_url; when an authenticated viewer opens the share-link and submits the form, the payload executes in the NocoDB origin and can read the session token from localStorage["nocodb-gui-v2"].
Details
The vulnerable sink is in packages/nc-gui/composables/useSharedFormViewStore.ts:
isValidRedirectUrlvalidated onlytypeof === 'string'and non-empty trim — no scheme check.- The submit branch built an anchor element, compared
anchor.hosttowindow.location.host, and either pushState-reloaded (same host) or assignedwindow.location.href = redirectUrl(otherwise). - For non-network schemes such as
javascript:,data:,vbscript:, andfile:,anchor.hostis the empty string, so the same-host check is false and the code falls into the external-redirect branch — executing the URL same-origin in the NocoDB tab.
The redirect_url field is writable by any user with editor role on the base via the form-view PATCH endpoint, and the value is returned verbatim by the public shared-view meta endpoint, so no further privilege is required to weaponize a public form share.
Impact
- Same-origin script execution in the viewer's NocoDB tab. The payload runs in the NocoDB origin and can read the session token at
localStorage["nocodb-gui-v2"].token. - Action under the viewer's identity. With the token, an attacker can call authenticated APIs as the viewer, scoped to whatever workspaces, bases, and operations that viewer is permitted to use.
- Single-click viewer flow. Form share-links are the intended distribution channel for forms, so the phishing surface is on-brand; the form can be configured with a single hidden pre-filled required field to reduce the viewer flow to one click.
Credit
This issue was reported by @kah-ja (turingpoint.de).
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.05.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nocodb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.05.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47387"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-05T16:20:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe shared form-view submit handler in NocoDB writes the form\u0027s `redirect_url` to `window.location.href` after a same-host check that does not validate the URL scheme. A user with `editor` role (or above) on any base can plant a `javascript:` URL in the form\u0027s `redirect_url`; when an authenticated viewer opens the share-link and submits the form, the payload executes in the NocoDB origin and can read the session token from `localStorage[\"nocodb-gui-v2\"]`.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable sink is in `packages/nc-gui/composables/useSharedFormViewStore.ts`:\n\n- `isValidRedirectUrl` validated only `typeof === \u0027string\u0027` and non-empty trim \u2014 no scheme check.\n- The submit branch built an anchor element, compared `anchor.host` to `window.location.host`, and either pushState-reloaded (same host) or assigned `window.location.href = redirectUrl` (otherwise).\n- For non-network schemes such as `javascript:`, `data:`, `vbscript:`, and `file:`, `anchor.host` is the empty string, so the same-host check is false and the code falls into the external-redirect branch \u2014 executing the URL same-origin in the NocoDB tab.\n\nThe `redirect_url` field is writable by any user with `editor` role on the base via the form-view PATCH endpoint, and the value is returned verbatim by the public shared-view meta endpoint, so no further privilege is required to weaponize a public form share.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Same-origin script execution in the viewer\u0027s NocoDB tab.** The payload runs in the NocoDB origin and can read the session token at `localStorage[\"nocodb-gui-v2\"].token`.\n- **Action under the viewer\u0027s identity.** With the token, an attacker can call authenticated APIs as the viewer, scoped to whatever workspaces, bases, and operations that viewer is permitted to use.\n- **Single-click viewer flow.** Form share-links are the intended distribution channel for forms, so the phishing surface is on-brand; the form can be configured with a single hidden pre-filled required field to reduce the viewer flow to one click.\n\n### Credit\n\nThis issue was reported by [@kah-ja](https://github.com/kah-ja) ([turingpoint.de](https://turingpoint.de)).",
"id": "GHSA-hj85-ph9q-78jg",
"modified": "2026-06-05T16:20:44Z",
"published": "2026-06-05T16:20:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/security/advisories/GHSA-hj85-ph9q-78jg"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/releases/tag/2026.05.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "NocoDB: Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Form View Redirect URL"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.