GHSA-HJ69-RW3G-J2MW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: usb: pegasus: do not advance rx_skb->data on dropped frames

For the 0x8513 chip, read_bulk_callback() skips the 2-byte receive header by advancing pegasus->rx_skb->data in place. This is done before the pkt_len > PEGASUS_MTU check, and when that check drops the frame the good path resubmits the same skb with the advanced rx_skb->data as the transfer buffer, still PEGASUS_MTU bytes long.

Every frame with an oversized length field therefore moves the receive buffer two more bytes towards the end of the skb data area. A device that keeps sending such frames makes the host controller write received data over skb_shared_info and past the end of the allocation, and the corrupted skb_shared_info is used when the skb is eventually freed. With an emulated device sending frames filled with 0x5a on a KASAN kernel:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dummy_timer+0xade/0x3f00 [dummy_hcd] Write of size 1536 at addr ffff888105821202 by task swapper/1/0 ... Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xeb4b474b4b4b4b4c: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x5a5a5a5a5a5a5a60-0x5a5a5a5a5a5a5a67] RIP: 0010:skb_release_data+0x36f/0x800

Only skip the header with skb_reserve() once the frame is going to be passed up, so the receive buffer always starts at the beginning of the skb data area. Unlike the old pointer adjustment, skb_reserve() also moves skb->tail, so the two header bytes now count against the buffer size: lower the length limit for the 0x8513 accordingly, otherwise a pkt_len of PEGASUS_MTU - 1 or PEGASUS_MTU would trip skb_over_panic().

Found by code review with LLM assistance and reproduced with an emulated USB device (raw-gadget + dummy_hcd).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99554"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:18:11Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: usb: pegasus: do not advance rx_skb-\u003edata on dropped frames\n\nFor the 0x8513 chip, read_bulk_callback() skips the 2-byte receive\nheader by advancing pegasus-\u003erx_skb-\u003edata in place. This is done before\nthe pkt_len \u003e PEGASUS_MTU check, and when that check drops the frame\nthe good path resubmits the same skb with the advanced rx_skb-\u003edata as\nthe transfer buffer, still PEGASUS_MTU bytes long.\n\nEvery frame with an oversized length field therefore moves the receive\nbuffer two more bytes towards the end of the skb data area. A device\nthat keeps sending such frames makes the host controller write received\ndata over skb_shared_info and past the end of the allocation, and the\ncorrupted skb_shared_info is used when the skb is eventually freed.\nWith an emulated device sending frames filled with 0x5a on a KASAN\nkernel:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dummy_timer+0xade/0x3f00 [dummy_hcd]\n  Write of size 1536 at addr ffff888105821202 by task swapper/1/0\n  ...\n  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xeb4b474b4b4b4b4c: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI\n  KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x5a5a5a5a5a5a5a60-0x5a5a5a5a5a5a5a67]\n  RIP: 0010:skb_release_data+0x36f/0x800\n\nOnly skip the header with skb_reserve() once the frame is going to be\npassed up, so the receive buffer always starts at the beginning of the\nskb data area. Unlike the old pointer adjustment, skb_reserve() also\nmoves skb-\u003etail, so the two header bytes now count against the buffer\nsize: lower the length limit for the 0x8513 accordingly, otherwise a\npkt_len of PEGASUS_MTU - 1 or PEGASUS_MTU would trip skb_over_panic().\n\nFound by code review with LLM assistance and reproduced with an\nemulated USB device (raw-gadget + dummy_hcd).",
  "id": "GHSA-hj69-rw3g-j2mw",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:28Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:31:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99554"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00c0c940c1c8941497a8cf511edc95fdde8c6382"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/05e204042f213f9d862c6901f53cece61aa5209c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6af7578840bde82e6cd5de3235502c116bcc196c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bfa09dccf98cf78dd9282259b2140bd1472f5ae9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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