GHSA-HHJV-QJ57-F47F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix WARNING in bpf_tracing_link_release
The trampoline could be corrupted by the blindly 'tr->flags = BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX' in verifier.
- A fexit attached to a tail_call_reachable prog. 'tr->flags' became 'BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG | BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX'. And, the trampoline would poke the target prog's nop insn using jmp insn instead of call insn.
- Another fexit loaded with the same tail_call_reachable prog target. 'tr->flags' became 'BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX'.
- Close the first fexit link. Due to no BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG in 'tr->flags', the trampoline will fail to restore the prog's nop insn using call insn.
[ 3.410719] WARNING: kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3551 at bpf_tracing_link_release+0x53/0x60, CPU#1: test_progs/98 ... [ 3.428793] bpf_link_free+0x58/0x130 [ 3.429293] bpf_link_release+0x23/0x30
Fix the warning by updating 'tr->flags' with '|=' and lock.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-92485"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:50Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix WARNING in bpf_tracing_link_release\n\nThe trampoline could be corrupted by the blindly\n\u0027tr-\u003eflags = BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX\u0027 in verifier.\n\n1. A fexit attached to a tail_call_reachable prog. \u0027tr-\u003eflags\u0027 became\n \u0027BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG | BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX\u0027. And, the\n trampoline would poke the target prog\u0027s nop insn using jmp insn instead\n of call insn.\n2. Another fexit loaded with the same tail_call_reachable prog target.\n \u0027tr-\u003eflags\u0027 became \u0027BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX\u0027.\n3. Close the first fexit link. Due to no BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG in\n \u0027tr-\u003eflags\u0027, the trampoline will fail to restore the prog\u0027s nop insn\n using call insn.\n\n[ 3.410719] WARNING: kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3551 at bpf_tracing_link_release+0x53/0x60, CPU#1: test_progs/98\n...\n[ 3.428793] bpf_link_free+0x58/0x130\n[ 3.429293] bpf_link_release+0x23/0x30\n\nFix the warning by updating \u0027tr-\u003eflags\u0027 with \u0027|=\u0027 and lock.",
"id": "GHSA-hhjv-qj57-f47f",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:39Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92485"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/094f0a895cf97a993d06d5dc4c12e7cb7da845a5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1757598b3804f7cb35b5b5e02558f6d8b9c2f254"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/48a0209d8da0d90a7b0a0db19d1ff88027b13781"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61aaa8782bec59ecffd22e030f54ef9351bcabf9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a5c6316052f0ff1467221ecf2996cbab0a496b1e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d02035c5eb4955616efc5c6dbe3d98f19d798cb2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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