GHSA-HH88-FX3H-F447
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-17 12:32 – Updated: 2024-04-17 12:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Use a memory barrier to enforce PTP WQ xmit submission tracking occurs after populating the metadata_map
Just simply reordering the functions mlx5e_ptp_metadata_map_put and mlx5e_ptpsq_track_metadata in the mlx5e_txwqe_complete context is not good enough since both the compiler and CPU are free to reorder these two functions. If reordering does occur, the issue that was supposedly fixed by 7e3f3ba97e6c ("net/mlx5e: Track xmit submission to PTP WQ after populating metadata map") will be seen. This will lead to NULL pointer dereferences in mlx5e_ptpsq_mark_ts_cqes_undelivered in the NAPI polling context due to the tracking list being populated before the metadata map.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-26858"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-17T11:15:08Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/mlx5e: Use a memory barrier to enforce PTP WQ xmit submission tracking occurs after populating the metadata_map\n\nJust simply reordering the functions mlx5e_ptp_metadata_map_put and\nmlx5e_ptpsq_track_metadata in the mlx5e_txwqe_complete context is not good\nenough since both the compiler and CPU are free to reorder these two\nfunctions. If reordering does occur, the issue that was supposedly fixed by\n7e3f3ba97e6c (\"net/mlx5e: Track xmit submission to PTP WQ after populating\nmetadata map\") will be seen. This will lead to NULL pointer dereferences in\nmlx5e_ptpsq_mark_ts_cqes_undelivered in the NAPI polling context due to the\ntracking list being populated before the metadata map.",
"id": "GHSA-hh88-fx3h-f447",
"modified": "2024-04-17T12:32:04Z",
"published": "2024-04-17T12:32:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-26858"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/936ef086161ab89a7f38f7a0761d6a3063c3277e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7cf07586c40f926063d4d09f7de28ff82f62b2a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d1f71615dbb305f14f3b756cce015d70d8667549"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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