GHSA-HGM4-F6J5-3X27
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix xmit_frame/xmit_buf leaks on mgnt-frame error paths
issue_beacon(), issue_probersp() and issue_asocrsp() obtain a management xmit_frame together with its xmit_buf from the driver's fixed-size management-TX pools via alloc_mgtxmitframe(). On the normal path the frame is handed to dump_mgntframe(), which transfers ownership and eventually returns both objects to their pools (the frame and, for beacons, the buf in rtl8723bs_mgnt_xmit(); other bufs via the pending-xmitbuf/TX-completion path).
Several error/edge paths return early after a successful alloc_mgtxmitframe() but before dump_mgntframe(), so ownership is never transferred and neither object is freed:
- issue_beacon(): beacon larger than 512 bytes
- issue_probersp(): cur_network->ie_length > MAX_IE_SZ
- issue_probersp(): kzalloc() of the SSID scratch buffer fails
- issue_asocrsp(): pkt_type is neither ASSOCRSP nor REASSOCRSP
Because alloc_mgtxmitframe() removes the frame and buf from their free lists (list_del_init) without placing them on any pending list, an orphaned pair is on no list and referenced by nobody, so it is only reclaimed at driver teardown. Repeated hits progressively exhaust the management-TX pools until alloc_mgtxmitframe() returns NULL and the interface can no longer send beacons or probe/assoc responses.
Free the frame and buffer on these paths, matching the existing correct error handling in issue_assocreq().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-100076"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-401"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T14:17:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nstaging: rtl8723bs: fix xmit_frame/xmit_buf leaks on mgnt-frame error paths\n\nissue_beacon(), issue_probersp() and issue_asocrsp() obtain a management\nxmit_frame together with its xmit_buf from the driver\u0027s fixed-size\nmanagement-TX pools via alloc_mgtxmitframe(). On the normal path the frame\nis handed to dump_mgntframe(), which transfers ownership and eventually\nreturns both objects to their pools (the frame and, for beacons, the buf\nin rtl8723bs_mgnt_xmit(); other bufs via the pending-xmitbuf/TX-completion\npath).\n\nSeveral error/edge paths return early after a successful\nalloc_mgtxmitframe() but before dump_mgntframe(), so ownership is never\ntransferred and neither object is freed:\n\n - issue_beacon(): beacon larger than 512 bytes\n - issue_probersp(): cur_network-\u003eie_length \u003e MAX_IE_SZ\n - issue_probersp(): kzalloc() of the SSID scratch buffer fails\n - issue_asocrsp(): pkt_type is neither ASSOCRSP nor REASSOCRSP\n\nBecause alloc_mgtxmitframe() removes the frame and buf from their free\nlists (list_del_init) without placing them on any pending list, an\norphaned pair is on no list and referenced by nobody, so it is only\nreclaimed at driver teardown. Repeated hits progressively exhaust the\nmanagement-TX pools until alloc_mgtxmitframe() returns NULL and the\ninterface can no longer send beacons or probe/assoc responses.\n\nFree the frame and buffer on these paths, matching the existing correct\nerror handling in issue_assocreq().",
"id": "GHSA-hgm4-f6j5-3x27",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:52Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T15:31:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100076"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/17260b5215d4ced17a733e2c027a76290e476fad"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f5e2752c2b4bad01df4523cfe2b41b702c60f00"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/41b8209376dffbd7b0b85c8bc4697d9166ac62ef"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c9f6a3b9fdd31a0836b681053155b5997c0156e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/973a629f19c226c8f6080badea7ccf59cc04233f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c48e5aa01525577d6b6e782962a5bfb0e1535cb5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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