GHSA-HGH8-4RM3-F2VP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-28 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: initialize FileSystemControlFlags in FS_CONTROL_INFORMATION
smb2_get_info_filesystem() reports 48 bytes for FS_CONTROL_INFORMATION, that is the whole of struct smb2_fs_control_info, but never assigns FileSystemControlFlags. Those four bytes go to the client as they are found in the response buffer.
The buffer is zeroed on allocation, so a standalone request leaks nothing. A compound request can leak: the offset of the next response is advanced by the length pinned for the previous one, so a reply that was written into the buffer and then dropped in favour of the short error response of smb2_set_err_rsp() stays there, and the next reply is laid over it with only the header cleared.
ksmbd does not implement quota tracking, so report no control flags.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99114"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-28T11:17:30Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: initialize FileSystemControlFlags in FS_CONTROL_INFORMATION\n\nsmb2_get_info_filesystem() reports 48 bytes for FS_CONTROL_INFORMATION,\nthat is the whole of struct smb2_fs_control_info, but never assigns\nFileSystemControlFlags. Those four bytes go to the client as they are\nfound in the response buffer.\n\nThe buffer is zeroed on allocation, so a standalone request leaks\nnothing. A compound request can leak: the offset of the next response\nis advanced by the length pinned for the previous one, so a reply that\nwas written into the buffer and then dropped in favour of the short\nerror response of smb2_set_err_rsp() stays there, and the next reply is\nlaid over it with only the header cleared.\n\nksmbd does not implement quota tracking, so report no control flags.",
"id": "GHSA-hgh8-4rm3-f2vp",
"modified": "2026-10-28T12:31:03Z",
"published": "2026-10-28T12:31:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99114"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03bb4338c3a7c3fc4decf699a35753f0891aab2a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c0cd3fc6824122014da2b3b0cb7ddeaa2946ec8e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8c450ad0d08980b39b08d435efa921086c8b227"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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