GHSA-HFRJ-R4V7-3997
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-06-25 09:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/memory-failure: fix hugetlb_lock AA deadlock in get_huge_page_for_hwpoison
Two concurrent madvise(MADV_HWPOISON) calls on the same hugetlb page can trigger a recursive spinlock self-deadlock (AA deadlock) on hugetlb_lock when racing with a concurrent unmap:
thread#0 thread#1 -------- -------- madvise(folio, MADV_HWPOISON) -> poisons the folio successfully madvise(folio, MADV_HWPOISON) unmap(folio) try_memory_failure_hugetlb get_huge_page_for_hwpoison spin_lock_irq(&hugetlb_lock) <- held __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison hugetlb_update_hwpoison() -> MF_HUGETLB_FOLIO_PRE_POISONED goto out: folio_put() refcount: 1 -> 0 free_huge_folio() spin_lock_irqsave(&hugetlb_lock) -> AA DEADLOCK!
The out: path in __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison() calls folio_put() to drop the GUP reference while the hugetlb_lock is still held by the hugetlb.c wrapper get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(). If concurrent unmap has released the page table mapping reference, folio_put() drops the folio refcount to zero, triggering free_huge_folio() which attempts to re-acquire the non-recursive hugetlb_lock.
Fix this by moving hugetlb_lock acquisition from the hugetlb.c wrapper into get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(). Place spin_unlock_irq() before the folio_put() at the out: label so the folio is always released outside the lock.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix race, rename label per Miaohe]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53207"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T09:16:38Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/memory-failure: fix hugetlb_lock AA deadlock in get_huge_page_for_hwpoison\n\nTwo concurrent madvise(MADV_HWPOISON) calls on the same hugetlb page can\ntrigger a recursive spinlock self-deadlock (AA deadlock) on hugetlb_lock\nwhen racing with a concurrent unmap:\n\n thread#0 thread#1\n -------- --------\n madvise(folio, MADV_HWPOISON)\n -\u003e poisons the folio successfully\n madvise(folio, MADV_HWPOISON) unmap(folio)\n try_memory_failure_hugetlb\n get_huge_page_for_hwpoison\n spin_lock_irq(\u0026hugetlb_lock) \u003c- held\n __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison\n hugetlb_update_hwpoison()\n -\u003e MF_HUGETLB_FOLIO_PRE_POISONED\n goto out:\n folio_put()\n refcount: 1 -\u003e 0\n free_huge_folio()\n spin_lock_irqsave(\u0026hugetlb_lock)\n -\u003e AA DEADLOCK!\n\nThe out: path in __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison() calls folio_put() to drop\nthe GUP reference while the hugetlb_lock is still held by the hugetlb.c\nwrapper get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(). If concurrent unmap has released\nthe page table mapping reference, folio_put() drops the folio refcount to\nzero, triggering free_huge_folio() which attempts to re-acquire the\nnon-recursive hugetlb_lock.\n\nFix this by moving hugetlb_lock acquisition from the hugetlb.c wrapper\ninto get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(). Place spin_unlock_irq() before the\nfolio_put() at the out: label so the folio is always released outside the\nlock.\n\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix race, rename label per Miaohe]",
"id": "GHSA-hfrj-r4v7-3997",
"modified": "2026-06-25T09:31:21Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T09:31:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53207"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c2d42b8ee345b17a4ba56b0f6492d1ff4c1178e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77b73b54801ae7137479c141fd0473a491c1dc48"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a33bfed648c10f5a1519981dbfad80841191edc8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf7ba8f96c258c30393814491930ae4ecdc5fe5e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd77a83915b07e2b0205adb284f08b39ae31dc4b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc3ff42cb0cbf947e4600ae9761c3783760050e2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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