GHSA-HFRJ-R4V7-3997

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-07-02 21:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/memory-failure: fix hugetlb_lock AA deadlock in get_huge_page_for_hwpoison

Two concurrent madvise(MADV_HWPOISON) calls on the same hugetlb page can trigger a recursive spinlock self-deadlock (AA deadlock) on hugetlb_lock when racing with a concurrent unmap:

thread#0 thread#1 -------- -------- madvise(folio, MADV_HWPOISON) -> poisons the folio successfully madvise(folio, MADV_HWPOISON) unmap(folio) try_memory_failure_hugetlb get_huge_page_for_hwpoison spin_lock_irq(&hugetlb_lock) <- held __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison hugetlb_update_hwpoison() -> MF_HUGETLB_FOLIO_PRE_POISONED goto out: folio_put() refcount: 1 -> 0 free_huge_folio() spin_lock_irqsave(&hugetlb_lock) -> AA DEADLOCK!

The out: path in __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison() calls folio_put() to drop the GUP reference while the hugetlb_lock is still held by the hugetlb.c wrapper get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(). If concurrent unmap has released the page table mapping reference, folio_put() drops the folio refcount to zero, triggering free_huge_folio() which attempts to re-acquire the non-recursive hugetlb_lock.

Fix this by moving hugetlb_lock acquisition from the hugetlb.c wrapper into get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(). Place spin_unlock_irq() before the folio_put() at the out: label so the folio is always released outside the lock.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix race, rename label per Miaohe]

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53207"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-667"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T09:16:38Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/memory-failure: fix hugetlb_lock AA deadlock in get_huge_page_for_hwpoison\n\nTwo concurrent madvise(MADV_HWPOISON) calls on the same hugetlb page can\ntrigger a recursive spinlock self-deadlock (AA deadlock) on hugetlb_lock\nwhen racing with a concurrent unmap:\n\n  thread#0                              thread#1\n  --------                              --------\n  madvise(folio, MADV_HWPOISON)\n    -\u003e poisons the folio successfully\n  madvise(folio, MADV_HWPOISON)         unmap(folio)\n    try_memory_failure_hugetlb\n      get_huge_page_for_hwpoison\n        spin_lock_irq(\u0026hugetlb_lock)    \u003c- held\n        __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison\n          hugetlb_update_hwpoison()\n            -\u003e MF_HUGETLB_FOLIO_PRE_POISONED\n          goto out:\n            folio_put()\n              refcount: 1 -\u003e 0\n              free_huge_folio()\n                spin_lock_irqsave(\u0026hugetlb_lock)\n                  -\u003e AA DEADLOCK!\n\nThe out: path in __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison() calls folio_put() to drop\nthe GUP reference while the hugetlb_lock is still held by the hugetlb.c\nwrapper get_huge_page_for_hwpoison().  If concurrent unmap has released\nthe page table mapping reference, folio_put() drops the folio refcount to\nzero, triggering free_huge_folio() which attempts to re-acquire the\nnon-recursive hugetlb_lock.\n\nFix this by moving hugetlb_lock acquisition from the hugetlb.c wrapper\ninto get_huge_page_for_hwpoison().  Place spin_unlock_irq() before the\nfolio_put() at the out: label so the folio is always released outside the\nlock.\n\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix race, rename label per Miaohe]",
  "id": "GHSA-hfrj-r4v7-3997",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T21:32:04Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T09:31:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53207"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c2d42b8ee345b17a4ba56b0f6492d1ff4c1178e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77b73b54801ae7137479c141fd0473a491c1dc48"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a33bfed648c10f5a1519981dbfad80841191edc8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf7ba8f96c258c30393814491930ae4ecdc5fe5e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd77a83915b07e2b0205adb284f08b39ae31dc4b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc3ff42cb0cbf947e4600ae9761c3783760050e2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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