GHSA-HFG3-MCR3-V8R7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: qla2xxx: Initialize NVMe abort_work once at submission

qla_nvme_fcp_abort() and qla_nvme_ls_abort() ran INIT_WORK() on priv->abort_work immediately before schedule_work(). INIT_WORK() reinitializes the work_struct, resetting its list head and clearing the pending bit. If an abort is issued more than once for the same command (for example, concurrent transport teardown and a timeout-driven abort), the second INIT_WORK() reinitializes a work item that is already queued, which can corrupt the workqueue list and lead to crashes or a looping worker.

Initialize priv->abort_work once at command submission, next to the existing per-command spin_lock_init(&priv->cmd_lock), and leave only schedule_work() in the abort paths. schedule_work() already does nothing when the work item is still pending, so a repeated abort no longer disturbs an in-flight work item. The command is not returned to the transport until the final kref_put()/release callback runs after abort_work has completed, so the work item is idle before priv is reused and the single submission-time INIT_WORK() is safe.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-89860"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:16:53Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qla2xxx: Initialize NVMe abort_work once at submission\n\nqla_nvme_fcp_abort() and qla_nvme_ls_abort() ran INIT_WORK() on\npriv-\u003eabort_work immediately before schedule_work(). INIT_WORK()\nreinitializes the work_struct, resetting its list head and clearing the\npending bit. If an abort is issued more than once for the same command\n(for example, concurrent transport teardown and a timeout-driven abort),\nthe second INIT_WORK() reinitializes a work item that is already queued,\nwhich can corrupt the workqueue list and lead to crashes or a looping\nworker.\n\nInitialize priv-\u003eabort_work once at command submission, next to the\nexisting per-command spin_lock_init(\u0026priv-\u003ecmd_lock), and leave only\nschedule_work() in the abort paths. schedule_work() already does nothing\nwhen the work item is still pending, so a repeated abort no longer\ndisturbs an in-flight work item. The command is not returned to the\ntransport until the final kref_put()/release callback runs after\nabort_work has completed, so the work item is idle before priv is reused\nand the single submission-time INIT_WORK() is safe.",
  "id": "GHSA-hfg3-mcr3-v8r7",
  "modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:29Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T12:30:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89860"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/17d9011c96f819e69074f465c04ee79e693de6a1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55259e225412721c3cc09e4d95a489542c0c05b0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67f0d5187c29360388f7e1e503c627ec45d01089"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a1b50c4879c2e6a034e8e85f9c055f0eea157c7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6ee4e3774349fa04bba13e668f3322db47d89b08"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e85f6dbc85616de2172bce8eaf84b387a723cd1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b403700ac62fbf3c310196386e125879a182efcf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f4aaa4a4e6f1da6f3abfd80e1917bef922287177"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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