GHSA-HCV8-3HR7-7X3X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: don't use eloc after the end of the unallocated space table
When udf_next_aext() returns 0, its eloc, elen and etype outputs hold no defined value. Two walks of the unallocated space table still use eloc after the walk has reached the end of the table.
udf_table_prealloc_blocks() looks for a free extent starting at first_block and decides whether it found one by comparing eloc with first_block after the walk. If the table's list ends in a continuation descriptor that leads to an empty allocation extent, eloc is then the block of that allocation extent, which is in use, and if that is first_block, the block is handed out as preallocation. Once udf_discard_prealloc() no longer frees the wrong block, this is what still makes fsx in generic/091 and generic/263 read back bad data on a table, in about one run in four. Only take the extent if the walk stopped at it.
When udf_table_free_blocks() cannot merge the freed blocks into an existing extent, it appends a new one and sets only its block number, so the partition reference comes from whatever eloc held after the walk, and with long allocation descriptors it is written to disk. For a table without extents, eloc was never set. Take the partition reference from the freed blocks instead. Short allocation descriptors do not store the partition reference, which is why this half remains a latent long-descriptor fix rather than a reproduced failure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99599"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:17:51Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nudf: don\u0027t use eloc after the end of the unallocated space table\n\nWhen udf_next_aext() returns 0, its eloc, elen and etype outputs hold\nno defined value. Two walks of the unallocated space table still use\neloc after the walk has reached the end of the table.\n\nudf_table_prealloc_blocks() looks for a free extent starting at\nfirst_block and decides whether it found one by comparing eloc with\nfirst_block after the walk. If the table\u0027s list ends in a continuation\ndescriptor that leads to an empty allocation extent, eloc is then the\nblock of that allocation extent, which is in use, and if that is\nfirst_block, the block is handed out as preallocation. Once\nudf_discard_prealloc() no longer frees the wrong block, this is what\nstill makes fsx in generic/091 and generic/263 read back bad data on a\ntable, in about one run in four. Only take the extent if the walk\nstopped at it.\n\nWhen udf_table_free_blocks() cannot merge the freed blocks into an\nexisting extent, it appends a new one and sets only its block number,\nso the partition reference comes from whatever eloc held after the\nwalk, and with long allocation descriptors it is written to disk. For\na table without extents, eloc was never set. Take the partition\nreference from the freed blocks instead. Short allocation descriptors\ndo not store the partition reference, which is why this half remains a\nlatent long-descriptor fix rather than a reproduced failure.",
"id": "GHSA-hcv8-3hr7-7x3x",
"modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:03Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T06:32:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99599"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ceb311c0f7af4f4b38fc1066178b84a60d61a05"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/812d49a09ce0a8fcc784349d6a95e975a4af51cf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/94401199df90e1c2a50c6e4b73618ac5a4ba83ba"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9ecd3d7ed7d7a57ee6af27dc22be0b3fdc9526f7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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