GHSA-HCPC-9V72-QF3V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-21 15:41
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: validate external xattr entries when reading metadata

ocfs2_validate_xattr_block() checks the xattr block header before the block reaches higher-level xattr users, but it does not verify that a non-indexed block's xh_count and entry offsets fit inside the block. Indexed buckets likewise reach list/get consumers after ECC without an entry-bounds check.

Use the flat xattr entry validator for non-indexed external xattr blocks, and use a bucket-specific validator for indexed buckets at metadata read time. The bucket validator keeps the entry array bounded by the first bucket block while checking name/value offsets against the bucket block they target.

Reject corrupted external xattr metadata before listxattr() or getxattr() can walk out-of-range entry arrays or name/value offsets.

Validation reproduced this kernel report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_list_entries+0xd7/0x190 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810a654007 by task ocfs2_xattr_lis/630 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 print_report+0xce/0x630 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 ocfs2_xattr_list_entries+0xd7/0x190 ocfs2_listxattr+0x3f6/0x610 listxattr+0x90/0xe0 path_listxattrat+0xed/0x220 do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-90320"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:29Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2: validate external xattr entries when reading metadata\n\nocfs2_validate_xattr_block() checks the xattr block header before the\nblock reaches higher-level xattr users, but it does not verify that a\nnon-indexed block\u0027s xh_count and entry offsets fit inside the block. \nIndexed buckets likewise reach list/get consumers after ECC without an\nentry-bounds check.\n\nUse the flat xattr entry validator for non-indexed external xattr blocks,\nand use a bucket-specific validator for indexed buckets at metadata read\ntime.  The bucket validator keeps the entry array bounded by the first\nbucket block while checking name/value offsets against the bucket block\nthey target.\n\nReject corrupted external xattr metadata before listxattr() or getxattr()\ncan walk out-of-range entry arrays or name/value offsets.\n\nValidation reproduced this kernel report:\nBUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_list_entries+0xd7/0x190\nRead of size 1 at addr ffff88810a654007 by task ocfs2_xattr_lis/630\nCall Trace:\n  dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0\n  print_report+0xce/0x630\n  kasan_report+0xe0/0x110\n  ocfs2_xattr_list_entries+0xd7/0x190\n  ocfs2_listxattr+0x3f6/0x610\n  listxattr+0x90/0xe0\n  path_listxattrat+0xed/0x220\n  do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0\n  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f",
  "id": "GHSA-hcpc-9v72-qf3v",
  "modified": "2026-10-21T15:41:22Z",
  "published": "2026-09-17T18:32:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90320"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2cf82b46d5e43be0dfbaac7fa1073cec2fc1f5e6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f4129b6905b7d638bbc9eb8013c3989cbe30b7e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc5778dbd0b6c411107a0e37e913a94b3c2f2728"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee4ef26927e967ea699b3f0d7ecf97ce044fbc79"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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