GHSA-H885-6XR2-HVV3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject >8 byte return values on return-reading trampoline paths
btf_distill_func_proto() builds the function model used for the fentry/fexit/fmod_ret/fsession trampolines and struct_ops. It has accepted a 16-byte __int128 return value since the trampoline was introduced: __get_type_size() returns the integer's type size, and the return-type check only rejected ret < 0.
But the BPF trampoline preserves only 8 bytes of the return value (RAX on x86, i.e. R0). For an attach type that reads the target's return value the second half (RDX / R3) is neither saved nor restored, so a program attached to a function returning a 16-byte value corrupts the value seen by the real caller and itself observes only half of it. struct_ops trampolines have the same limitation.
This affects the attach types that read the target's return value: fexit, fmod_ret and fsession (plus the _multi variants of fexit and fsession), and struct_ops. fentry/fentry_multi run before the target returns and are unaffected.
Reject a >8 byte return value for these attach types in bpf_check_attach_target() and bpf_check_attach_btf_id_multi(), and for struct_ops in bpf_struct_ops_desc_init().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90359"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:34Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Reject \u003e8 byte return values on return-reading trampoline paths\n\nbtf_distill_func_proto() builds the function model used for the\nfentry/fexit/fmod_ret/fsession trampolines and struct_ops. It has\naccepted a 16-byte __int128 return value since the trampoline was\nintroduced: __get_type_size() returns the integer\u0027s type size, and the\nreturn-type check only rejected ret \u003c 0.\n\nBut the BPF trampoline preserves only 8 bytes of the return value (RAX on\nx86, i.e. R0). For an attach type that reads the target\u0027s return value the\nsecond half (RDX / R3) is neither saved nor restored, so a program\nattached to a function returning a 16-byte value corrupts the value seen\nby the real caller and itself observes only half of it. struct_ops\ntrampolines have the same limitation.\n\nThis affects the attach types that read the target\u0027s return value: fexit,\nfmod_ret and fsession (plus the _multi variants of fexit and fsession),\nand struct_ops. fentry/fentry_multi run before the target returns and are\nunaffected.\n\nReject a \u003e8 byte return value for these attach types in\nbpf_check_attach_target() and bpf_check_attach_btf_id_multi(), and for\nstruct_ops in bpf_struct_ops_desc_init().",
"id": "GHSA-h885-6xr2-hvv3",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:32:02Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90359"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c48796aa6c392cde93946e5d5a9a1f1b1cf72feb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d36ac53fc83baf843c51b7afd6d2471f36b713d8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.