GHSA-H7WH-PXV4-FRW3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: reject FIND data areas that run past the received response

CIFSFindFirst() and CIFSFindNext() take the directory entries of a TRANS2_FIND_FIRST2 or TRANS2_FIND_NEXT2 response from DataOffset for DataCount bytes. validate_t2() bounds DataOffset at 1024 and ParameterCount + DataCount by the byte count, and nothing compares DataOffset + DataCount with the number of bytes SendReceive() copied into the buffer.

smb_init() places the request and the response in the same cifs_request allocation and cifs_buf_get() clears only the start of it, so a short response whose data area extends past its end has srch_entries_start point at bytes of the request that was just sent, or at whatever the allocation held before, and those bytes are parsed as directory entries. cifs_readdir() and find_cifs_entry() walk the entries with nxt_dir_entry(), which checks every entry but the first of a response against the end of the SMB; cifs_query_path_info() and cifs_backup_query_path_info() read the first entry with no check at all. Those reads stay inside the allocation, but what they return is not part of the response. The last entry, which LastNameOffset locates relative to the data area, is bounded against the received response by an earlier patch of this series, as is every entry that cifs_fill_dirent() parses; the walk itself and the two query functions are not.

SMB1 is not negotiated by default; reaching this code requires an explicit vers=1.0 mount.

Reject a response whose data area extends past the received length, with the -EINVAL that validate_t2() returns for the other malformed transaction responses. cifs_query_path_info() and cifs_backup_query_path_info() still read a whole entry from a data area that may be smaller than one; that is not changed here.

A conforming server is not affected. The data block of a transaction response is part of the SMB, so DataOffset + DataCount cannot exceed the smbCalcSize() bytes that SendReceive() copies; coalesce_t2() appends each secondary response to the data area and adds its length to both DataCount and the byte count, which keeps that relation.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99382"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:17:50Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: reject FIND data areas that run past the received response\n\nCIFSFindFirst() and CIFSFindNext() take the directory entries of a\nTRANS2_FIND_FIRST2 or TRANS2_FIND_NEXT2 response from DataOffset for\nDataCount bytes. validate_t2() bounds DataOffset at 1024 and\nParameterCount + DataCount by the byte count, and nothing compares\nDataOffset + DataCount with the number of bytes SendReceive() copied\ninto the buffer.\n\nsmb_init() places the request and the response in the same\ncifs_request allocation and cifs_buf_get() clears only the start of\nit, so a short response whose data area extends past its end has\nsrch_entries_start point at bytes of the request that was just sent,\nor at whatever the allocation held before, and those bytes are parsed\nas directory entries. cifs_readdir() and find_cifs_entry() walk the\nentries with nxt_dir_entry(), which checks every entry but the first\nof a response against the end of the SMB; cifs_query_path_info() and\ncifs_backup_query_path_info() read the first entry with no check at\nall. Those reads stay inside the allocation, but what they return is\nnot part of the response. The last entry, which LastNameOffset locates\nrelative to the data area, is bounded against the received response\nby an earlier patch of this series, as is every entry that\ncifs_fill_dirent() parses; the walk itself and the two query functions\nare not.\n\nSMB1 is not negotiated by default; reaching this code requires an\nexplicit vers=1.0 mount.\n\nReject a response whose data area extends past the received length,\nwith the -EINVAL that validate_t2() returns for the other malformed\ntransaction responses. cifs_query_path_info() and\ncifs_backup_query_path_info() still read a whole entry from a data\narea that may be smaller than one; that is not changed here.\n\nA conforming server is not affected. The data block of a transaction\nresponse is part of the SMB, so DataOffset + DataCount cannot exceed\nthe smbCalcSize() bytes that SendReceive() copies; coalesce_t2()\nappends each secondary response to the data area and adds its length\nto both DataCount and the byte count, which keeps that relation.",
  "id": "GHSA-h7wh-pxv4-frw3",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:22Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99382"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/29bd6773187cb5c1bbbdf90d677c6add7d58af26"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4dfc78e53f419834d99e626fc27083799e2ea4c1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9763e65a0a4588217cee2c05a00f1023820519b9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dbc8b87b91b1838beb3e7135a592bbbbd7741404"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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