GHSA-H72J-469C-C787
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-21 18:30 – Updated: 2024-10-31 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vrf: revert "vrf: Remove unnecessary RCU-bh critical section"
This reverts commit 504fc6f4f7f681d2a03aa5f68aad549d90eab853.
dev_queue_xmit_nit is expected to be called with BH disabled. __dev_queue_xmit has the following:
/* Disable soft irqs for various locks below. Also
* stops preemption for RCU.
*/
rcu_read_lock_bh();
VRF must follow this invariant. The referenced commit removed this protection. Which triggered a lockdep warning:
================================
WARNING: inconsistent lock state
6.11.0 #1 Tainted: G W
--------------------------------
inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage.
btserver/134819 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
ffff8882da30c118 (rlock-AF_PACKET){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: tpacket_rcv+0x863/0x3b30
{IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at:
lock_acquire+0x19a/0x4f0
_raw_spin_lock+0x27/0x40
packet_rcv+0xa33/0x1320
__netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0xcb0/0x3a90
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x2c9/0x890
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x610/0xcc0
[...]
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(rlock-AF_PACKET);
<Interrupt>
lock(rlock-AF_PACKET);
*** DEADLOCK ***
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0xa0
mark_lock+0x102e/0x16b0
__lock_acquire+0x9ae/0x6170
lock_acquire+0x19a/0x4f0
_raw_spin_lock+0x27/0x40
tpacket_rcv+0x863/0x3b30
dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x709/0xa40
vrf_finish_direct+0x26e/0x340 [vrf]
vrf_l3_out+0x5f4/0xe80 [vrf]
__ip_local_out+0x51e/0x7a0
[...]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-49980"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-667"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-21T18:15:18Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvrf: revert \"vrf: Remove unnecessary RCU-bh critical section\"\n\nThis reverts commit 504fc6f4f7f681d2a03aa5f68aad549d90eab853.\n\ndev_queue_xmit_nit is expected to be called with BH disabled.\n__dev_queue_xmit has the following:\n\n /* Disable soft irqs for various locks below. Also\n * stops preemption for RCU.\n */\n rcu_read_lock_bh();\n\nVRF must follow this invariant. The referenced commit removed this\nprotection. Which triggered a lockdep warning:\n\n\t================================\n\tWARNING: inconsistent lock state\n\t6.11.0 #1 Tainted: G W\n\t--------------------------------\n\tinconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -\u003e {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage.\n\tbtserver/134819 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:\n\tffff8882da30c118 (rlock-AF_PACKET){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: tpacket_rcv+0x863/0x3b30\n\t{IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at:\n\t lock_acquire+0x19a/0x4f0\n\t _raw_spin_lock+0x27/0x40\n\t packet_rcv+0xa33/0x1320\n\t __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0xcb0/0x3a90\n\t __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x2c9/0x890\n\t netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x610/0xcc0\n [...]\n\n\tother info that might help us debug this:\n\t Possible unsafe locking scenario:\n\n\t CPU0\n\t ----\n\t lock(rlock-AF_PACKET);\n\t \u003cInterrupt\u003e\n\t lock(rlock-AF_PACKET);\n\n\t *** DEADLOCK ***\n\n\tCall Trace:\n\t \u003cTASK\u003e\n\t dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0xa0\n\t mark_lock+0x102e/0x16b0\n\t __lock_acquire+0x9ae/0x6170\n\t lock_acquire+0x19a/0x4f0\n\t _raw_spin_lock+0x27/0x40\n\t tpacket_rcv+0x863/0x3b30\n\t dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x709/0xa40\n\t vrf_finish_direct+0x26e/0x340 [vrf]\n\t vrf_l3_out+0x5f4/0xe80 [vrf]\n\t __ip_local_out+0x51e/0x7a0\n [...]",
"id": "GHSA-h72j-469c-c787",
"modified": "2024-10-31T15:30:58Z",
"published": "2024-10-21T18:30:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49980"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/718a752bd746b3f4dd62516bb437baf73d548415"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c9381b3138246d46536db93ed696832abd70204"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b04c4d9eb4f25b950b33218e33b04c94e7445e51"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e61f8c4d179b2ffc0d3b7f821c3734be738643d0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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