GHSA-H72J-469C-C787

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-21 18:30 – Updated: 2024-10-31 15:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vrf: revert "vrf: Remove unnecessary RCU-bh critical section"

This reverts commit 504fc6f4f7f681d2a03aa5f68aad549d90eab853.

dev_queue_xmit_nit is expected to be called with BH disabled. __dev_queue_xmit has the following:

    /* Disable soft irqs for various locks below. Also
     * stops preemption for RCU.
     */
    rcu_read_lock_bh();

VRF must follow this invariant. The referenced commit removed this protection. Which triggered a lockdep warning:

================================
WARNING: inconsistent lock state
6.11.0 #1 Tainted: G        W
--------------------------------
inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage.
btserver/134819 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
ffff8882da30c118 (rlock-AF_PACKET){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: tpacket_rcv+0x863/0x3b30
{IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at:
  lock_acquire+0x19a/0x4f0
  _raw_spin_lock+0x27/0x40
  packet_rcv+0xa33/0x1320
  __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0xcb0/0x3a90
  __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x2c9/0x890
  netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x610/0xcc0
      [...]

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(rlock-AF_PACKET);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(rlock-AF_PACKET);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0xa0
 mark_lock+0x102e/0x16b0
 __lock_acquire+0x9ae/0x6170
 lock_acquire+0x19a/0x4f0
 _raw_spin_lock+0x27/0x40
 tpacket_rcv+0x863/0x3b30
 dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x709/0xa40
 vrf_finish_direct+0x26e/0x340 [vrf]
 vrf_l3_out+0x5f4/0xe80 [vrf]
 __ip_local_out+0x51e/0x7a0
      [...]
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-49980"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-667"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-21T18:15:18Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvrf: revert \"vrf: Remove unnecessary RCU-bh critical section\"\n\nThis reverts commit 504fc6f4f7f681d2a03aa5f68aad549d90eab853.\n\ndev_queue_xmit_nit is expected to be called with BH disabled.\n__dev_queue_xmit has the following:\n\n        /* Disable soft irqs for various locks below. Also\n         * stops preemption for RCU.\n         */\n        rcu_read_lock_bh();\n\nVRF must follow this invariant. The referenced commit removed this\nprotection. Which triggered a lockdep warning:\n\n\t================================\n\tWARNING: inconsistent lock state\n\t6.11.0 #1 Tainted: G        W\n\t--------------------------------\n\tinconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -\u003e {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage.\n\tbtserver/134819 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:\n\tffff8882da30c118 (rlock-AF_PACKET){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: tpacket_rcv+0x863/0x3b30\n\t{IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at:\n\t  lock_acquire+0x19a/0x4f0\n\t  _raw_spin_lock+0x27/0x40\n\t  packet_rcv+0xa33/0x1320\n\t  __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0xcb0/0x3a90\n\t  __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x2c9/0x890\n\t  netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x610/0xcc0\n          [...]\n\n\tother info that might help us debug this:\n\t Possible unsafe locking scenario:\n\n\t       CPU0\n\t       ----\n\t  lock(rlock-AF_PACKET);\n\t  \u003cInterrupt\u003e\n\t    lock(rlock-AF_PACKET);\n\n\t *** DEADLOCK ***\n\n\tCall Trace:\n\t \u003cTASK\u003e\n\t dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0xa0\n\t mark_lock+0x102e/0x16b0\n\t __lock_acquire+0x9ae/0x6170\n\t lock_acquire+0x19a/0x4f0\n\t _raw_spin_lock+0x27/0x40\n\t tpacket_rcv+0x863/0x3b30\n\t dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x709/0xa40\n\t vrf_finish_direct+0x26e/0x340 [vrf]\n\t vrf_l3_out+0x5f4/0xe80 [vrf]\n\t __ip_local_out+0x51e/0x7a0\n          [...]",
  "id": "GHSA-h72j-469c-c787",
  "modified": "2024-10-31T15:30:58Z",
  "published": "2024-10-21T18:30:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49980"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/718a752bd746b3f4dd62516bb437baf73d548415"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c9381b3138246d46536db93ed696832abd70204"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b04c4d9eb4f25b950b33218e33b04c94e7445e51"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e61f8c4d179b2ffc0d3b7f821c3734be738643d0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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