GHSA-H6VV-PCQ8-7XM4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 14:08 – Updated: 2026-06-17 14:08
VLAI
Summary
NocoDB: Server-Side Request Forgery via Base Migration URL
Details

Summary

The base-migration endpoint accepted a caller-supplied URL that the migration worker dereferenced without enforcing protocol or destination, allowing scheme abuse (file:, ftp:, etc.) and probing of internal HTTP destinations.

Details

The migrate endpoint is restricted to the workspace owner role by ACL. The remaining gaps were (a) protocol validation — the controller now parses body.migrationUrl as a URL and rejects anything whose protocol is not http: or https: — and (b) private destination filtering — the worker already runs through useAgent(targetUrl) from request-filtering-agent, which blocks RFC 1918, loopback, and link-local at the socket layer.

Impact

With the workspace owner role, a malformed URL could be used to coerce the migration worker into reading local files or talking to non-HTTP services; combined with the HTTP-only filter, owner-supplied targets could not reach private ranges.

Credit

This issue was reported by Devel Group Security Research Team through @TREXNEGRO. It was independently reported by @Lihfdgjr and [@bugbunny-research (https://github.com/bugbunny-research).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "nocodb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.301.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53930"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-17T14:08:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe base-migration endpoint accepted a caller-supplied URL that the migration worker\ndereferenced without enforcing protocol or destination, allowing scheme abuse\n(`file:`, `ftp:`, etc.) and probing of internal HTTP destinations.\n\n### Details\nThe `migrate` endpoint is restricted to the workspace owner role by ACL. The remaining\ngaps were (a) protocol validation \u2014 the controller now parses `body.migrationUrl` as a\n`URL` and rejects anything whose protocol is not `http:` or `https:` \u2014 and (b) private\ndestination filtering \u2014 the worker already runs through `useAgent(targetUrl)` from\n`request-filtering-agent`, which blocks RFC 1918, loopback, and link-local at the\nsocket layer.\n\n### Impact\nWith the workspace owner role, a malformed URL could be used to coerce the migration\nworker into reading local files or talking to non-HTTP services; combined with the\nHTTP-only filter, owner-supplied targets could not reach private ranges.\n\n### Credit\nThis issue was reported by Devel Group Security Research Team through [@TREXNEGRO](https://github.com/TREXNEGRO).\nIt was independently reported by [@Lihfdgjr](https://github.com/Lihfdgjr) and [@bugbunny-research (https://github.com/bugbunny-research).",
  "id": "GHSA-h6vv-pcq8-7xm4",
  "modified": "2026-06-17T14:08:04Z",
  "published": "2026-06-17T14:08:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/security/advisories/GHSA-h6vv-pcq8-7xm4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "NocoDB: Server-Side Request Forgery via Base Migration URL"
}


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