GHSA-H68Q-3G2M-9W2F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-24 18:32 – Updated: 2026-06-24 18:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ima_fs: Correctly create securityfs files for unsupported hash algos

ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].crypto_id is initialized to HASH_ALGO__LAST if the TPM algorithm is not supported. However there are places relying on the algorithm to be valid because it is accessed by hash_algo_name[].

On 6.12.40 I observe the following read out-of-bounds in hash_algo_name: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440 Read of size 8 at addr ffffffff83e18138 by task swapper/0/1

CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.40 #3 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x61/0x90 print_report+0xc4/0x580 ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x26/0x80 ? create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440 kasan_report+0xc2/0x100 ? create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440 create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440 ima_fs_init+0xa3/0x300 ima_init+0x7d/0xd0 init_ima+0x28/0x100 do_one_initcall+0xa6/0x3e0 kernel_init_freeable+0x455/0x740 kernel_init+0x24/0x1d0 ret_from_fork+0x38/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20

The buggy address belongs to the variable: hash_algo_name+0xb8/0x420

Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff83e18000: 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 ffffffff83e18080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

ffffffff83e18100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 05 f9 f9 ^ ffffffff83e18180: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 ffffffff83e18200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 ==================================================================

Seems like the TPM chip supports sha3_256, which isn't yet in tpm_algorithms: tpm tpm0: TPM with unsupported bank algorithm 0x0027

That's TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 == 0x0027 from "Trusted Platform Module 2.0 Library Part 2: Structures", page 51 1. See also the related U-Boot algorithms update 2.

Thus solve the problem by creating a file name with "tpm_alg" postfix if the crypto algorithm isn't initialized.

This is how it looks on the test machine (patch ported to v6.12 release): # ls -1 /sys/kernel/security/ima/ ascii_runtime_measurements ascii_runtime_measurements_tpm_alg_27 ascii_runtime_measurements_sha1 ascii_runtime_measurements_sha256 binary_runtime_measurements binary_runtime_measurements_tpm_alg_27 binary_runtime_measurements_sha1 binary_runtime_measurements_sha256 policy runtime_measurements_count violations

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53038"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T17:17:15Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nima_fs: Correctly create securityfs files for unsupported hash algos\n\nima_tpm_chip-\u003eallocated_banks[i].crypto_id is initialized to\nHASH_ALGO__LAST if the TPM algorithm is not supported. However there\nare places relying on the algorithm to be valid because it is accessed\nby hash_algo_name[].\n\nOn 6.12.40 I observe the following read out-of-bounds in hash_algo_name:\n  ==================================================================\n  BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440\n  Read of size 8 at addr ffffffff83e18138 by task swapper/0/1\n\n  CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.40 #3\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cTASK\u003e\n   dump_stack_lvl+0x61/0x90\n   print_report+0xc4/0x580\n   ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x26/0x80\n   ? create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440\n   kasan_report+0xc2/0x100\n   ? create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440\n   create_securityfs_measurement_lists+0x396/0x440\n   ima_fs_init+0xa3/0x300\n   ima_init+0x7d/0xd0\n   init_ima+0x28/0x100\n   do_one_initcall+0xa6/0x3e0\n   kernel_init_freeable+0x455/0x740\n   kernel_init+0x24/0x1d0\n   ret_from_fork+0x38/0x80\n   ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20\n   \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\n  The buggy address belongs to the variable:\n   hash_algo_name+0xb8/0x420\n\n  Memory state around the buggy address:\n   ffffffff83e18000: 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9\n   ffffffff83e18080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\n  \u003effffffff83e18100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 05 f9 f9\n                                          ^\n   ffffffff83e18180: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9\n   ffffffff83e18200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9\n  ==================================================================\n\nSeems like the TPM chip supports sha3_256, which isn\u0027t yet in\ntpm_algorithms:\n  tpm tpm0: TPM with unsupported bank algorithm 0x0027\n\nThat\u0027s TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 == 0x0027 from \"Trusted Platform Module 2.0\nLibrary Part 2: Structures\", page 51 [1].\nSee also the related U-Boot algorithms update [2].\n\nThus solve the problem by creating a file name with \"_tpm_alg_\u003cID\u003e\"\npostfix if the crypto algorithm isn\u0027t initialized.\n\nThis is how it looks on the test machine (patch ported to v6.12 release):\n  # ls -1 /sys/kernel/security/ima/\n  ascii_runtime_measurements\n  ascii_runtime_measurements_tpm_alg_27\n  ascii_runtime_measurements_sha1\n  ascii_runtime_measurements_sha256\n  binary_runtime_measurements\n  binary_runtime_measurements_tpm_alg_27\n  binary_runtime_measurements_sha1\n  binary_runtime_measurements_sha256\n  policy\n  runtime_measurements_count\n  violations\n\n[1]: https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Trusted-Platform-Module-2.0-Library-Part-2-Version-184_pub.pdf\n[2]: https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2024-July/558835.html",
  "id": "GHSA-h68q-3g2m-9w2f",
  "modified": "2026-06-24T18:32:44Z",
  "published": "2026-06-24T18:32:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53038"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/081b557cb56e1cfa8d1619b2601b01c53e3f418c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88d4e89a39f0de07798ca3fd93bd1a9ea212a82e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6766b171a5c4c33b26ff6fec530cb798db1f75e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7bd8cf0b348d3edae7bee33e74a32b21668b181"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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