GHSA-H68F-VQ23-XJH9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 09:31 – Updated: 2026-08-29 09:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: bound interrupt-vector register fill to the allocated array
idpf_get_reg_intr_vecs() fills the caller-allocated reg_vals[] array from the VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply in adapter->req_vec_chunks, bounding its inner loop only by the per-chunk num_vectors. The array is sized separately: idpf_intr_reg_init() allocates kzalloc_objs(struct idpf_vec_regs, total_vecs) from caps.num_allocated_vectors and only checks the returned count after the fill. The sum of per-chunk num_vectors is never reconciled against total_vecs, so a reply with a small num_allocated_vectors but chunks summing higher writes past the end of reg_vals[].
Impact: a control plane (a PF or hypervisor device model) that returns a VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply whose per-chunk num_vectors sum exceeds num_allocated_vectors writes struct idpf_vec_regs entries past the end of the reg_vals kmalloc allocation (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds write).
Bound the fill loop to the array capacity passed in by the callers, mirroring the sibling idpf_vport_get_q_reg(). The existing num_regs < num_vecs check then rejects an undersized reply without the out-of-bounds write happening first.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80693"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-28T08:16:54Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nidpf: bound interrupt-vector register fill to the allocated array\n\nidpf_get_reg_intr_vecs() fills the caller-allocated reg_vals[] array from\nthe VIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply in adapter-\u003ereq_vec_chunks, bounding\nits inner loop only by the per-chunk num_vectors. The array is sized\nseparately: idpf_intr_reg_init() allocates\nkzalloc_objs(struct idpf_vec_regs, total_vecs) from\ncaps.num_allocated_vectors and only checks the returned count after the\nfill. The sum of per-chunk num_vectors is never reconciled against\ntotal_vecs, so a reply with a small num_allocated_vectors but chunks\nsumming higher writes past the end of reg_vals[].\n\nImpact: a control plane (a PF or hypervisor device model) that returns a\nVIRTCHNL2_OP_ALLOC_VECTORS reply whose per-chunk num_vectors sum exceeds\nnum_allocated_vectors writes struct idpf_vec_regs entries past the end of\nthe reg_vals kmalloc allocation (KASAN slab-out-of-bounds write).\n\nBound the fill loop to the array capacity passed in by the callers,\nmirroring the sibling idpf_vport_get_q_reg(). The existing\nnum_regs \u003c num_vecs check then rejects an undersized reply without the\nout-of-bounds write happening first.",
"id": "GHSA-h68f-vq23-xjh9",
"modified": "2026-08-29T09:30:28Z",
"published": "2026-08-28T09:31:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80693"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/41bb8748124d0d8ee5d8e1eace9dfbc874bc9564"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f7007ee9858c99aa43101bc8352c672fee85644"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.