GHSA-H634-6F45-J5WJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-06-28 09:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: validate embedded INIT chunk and address list lengths in cookie
sctp_unpack_cookie() only checked that the embedded INIT chunk length did not exceed the remaining cookie payload, but did not ensure that the INIT chunk is large enough to contain a complete INIT header.
A malformed COOKIE_ECHO can therefore carry a truncated INIT chunk whose length field is smaller than sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk). Later, sctp_process_init() accesses INIT parameters unconditionally, which may lead to out-of-bounds reads.
In addition, raw_addr_list_len is not fully validated against the remaining cookie payload. When cookie authentication is disabled, an attacker can supply an oversized raw_addr_list_len and cause sctp_raw_to_bind_addrs() to read beyond the end of the cookie. The address parser also lacks sufficient bounds checks for parameter headers and lengths, allowing malformed address parameters to trigger out-of-bounds reads.
Fix this by:
- requiring the embedded INIT chunk length to be at least sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk);
- validating that the INIT chunk and raw address list together fit within the cookie payload;
- verifying sufficient data exists for each address parameter header and payload before parsing it.
Note that sctp_verify_init() must be called after sctp_unpack_cookie() and before sctp_process_init() when cookie authentication is disabled. This will be addressed in a separate patch.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53224"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T09:16:40Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: validate embedded INIT chunk and address list lengths in cookie\n\nsctp_unpack_cookie() only checked that the embedded INIT chunk length\ndid not exceed the remaining cookie payload, but did not ensure that the\nINIT chunk is large enough to contain a complete INIT header.\n\nA malformed COOKIE_ECHO can therefore carry a truncated INIT chunk whose\nlength field is smaller than sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk). Later,\nsctp_process_init() accesses INIT parameters unconditionally, which may\nlead to out-of-bounds reads.\n\nIn addition, raw_addr_list_len is not fully validated against the\nremaining cookie payload. When cookie authentication is disabled, an\nattacker can supply an oversized raw_addr_list_len and cause\nsctp_raw_to_bind_addrs() to read beyond the end of the cookie. The\naddress parser also lacks sufficient bounds checks for parameter headers\nand lengths, allowing malformed address parameters to trigger\nout-of-bounds reads.\n\nFix this by:\n\n- requiring the embedded INIT chunk length to be at least sizeof(struct\n sctp_init_chunk);\n- validating that the INIT chunk and raw address list together fit\n within the cookie payload;\n- verifying sufficient data exists for each address parameter header and\n payload before parsing it.\n\nNote that sctp_verify_init() must be called after sctp_unpack_cookie()\nand before sctp_process_init() when cookie authentication is disabled.\nThis will be addressed in a separate patch.",
"id": "GHSA-h634-6f45-j5wj",
"modified": "2026-06-28T09:31:45Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T09:31:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53224"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/512a9bb77c04ac9927648ea58af617e472be96e6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f4c80a2a7e6d06753b89a578b710a2499a5e62b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7560afb8cddafd829e709d7ea09230e45a825557"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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