GHSA-H5RC-J5F5-3GCM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-04 20:28 – Updated: 2025-08-05 17:11Summary
The channel window adjust message of the SSH protocol is used to track the free space in the receive buffer of the other side of a channel. The current implementation takes the value from the message and adds it to an internal state value. This can result in a integer overflow. If the Rust code is compiled with overflow checks, it will panic. A malicious client can crash a server.
Details
According https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4254#section-5.2, The value must not overflow. The incorrect handling is done in server/encrypted.rs and client/encrypted.rs in the handling of CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST.
let amount = map_err!(u32::decode(&mut r))?;
...
channel.recipient_window_size += amount;
It could be replaced with something like
if let Some(ref mut channel) = enc.channels.get_mut(&channel_num) {
// rfc 4254: The window MUST NOT be increased above 2^32 - 1 bytes.
new_size = channel.recipient_window_size.saturating_add(amount);
channel.recipient_window_size = new_size;
}
...
PoC
A customized client code would be required to send a message with a big value like u32_max. Not done yet.
Impact
This problem seems only critical to a server. One user can crash the server, which might take down the service. A malicious server could also crash a single client, but this seems not very critical.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "russh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.54.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-54804"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-04T20:28:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-05T01:15:42Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe channel window adjust message of the SSH protocol is used to track the free space in the receive buffer of the other side of a channel. The current implementation takes the value from the message and adds it to an internal state value. This can result in a integer overflow. If the Rust code is compiled with overflow checks, it will panic. A malicious client can crash a server. \n\n### Details\nAccording https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4254#section-5.2, The value must not overflow. \nThe incorrect handling is done in server/encrypted.rs and client/encrypted.rs in the handling of CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST. \n\n```\nlet amount = map_err!(u32::decode(\u0026mut r))?;\n...\nchannel.recipient_window_size += amount;\n```\n\nIt could be replaced with something like \n\n```\n if let Some(ref mut channel) = enc.channels.get_mut(\u0026channel_num) {\n // rfc 4254: The window MUST NOT be increased above 2^32 - 1 bytes.\n new_size = channel.recipient_window_size.saturating_add(amount);\n channel.recipient_window_size = new_size;\n }\n...\n```\n\n### PoC\nA customized client code would be required to send a message with a big value like u32_max. Not done yet.\n\n### Impact\nThis problem seems only critical to a server. One user can crash the server, which might take down the service. A malicious server could also crash a single client, but this seems not very critical.",
"id": "GHSA-h5rc-j5f5-3gcm",
"modified": "2025-08-05T17:11:17Z",
"published": "2025-08-04T20:28:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-h5rc-j5f5-3gcm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54804"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/0eb5e406780890e21ff71dd25d731b30676478e5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "russh is missing overflow checks during channel windows adjust"
}
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