GHSA-H5JV-8253-3CFR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: pin refcount trees before dropping the lookup lock
A refcount tree returned to ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree() must stay alive until that caller releases its operation reference. However, ocfs2_get_refcount_tree() returns the cached pointer after dropping osb_lock, and the caller only takes its kref afterwards. The registry reference does not protect this gap from concurrent removal.
This can happen when another node frees a refcount root and reuses its block with a different generation while this mount retains the old cached tree. Two local operations on different inodes sharing the new root, such as data CoW and an external xattr update, can then look up the same stale tree. Their inode locks are independent, and both the REFCOUNT DLM lock and rf_sem are acquired after the first operation reference.
The following ordering is possible, with no other operation references:
Data CoW Xattr update -------- ------------ Look up the old tree under osb_lock, then drop osb_lock Look up the same tree and take a kref Acquire the tree locks and read the new on-disk generation Erase the old tree under osb_lock Unlock and drop the operation kref Drop the registry kref, freeing tree Take a kref through the freed tree pointer
The final kref_get() accesses freed rf_getcnt storage, and subsequent accesses in ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree() also use the freed allocation.
Take the operation reference in ocfs2_get_refcount_tree() before releasing osb_lock, including when an insertion loses to another lookup. Removal must acquire the same lock, so it cannot drop the registry reference before the lookup has pinned the tree. Keep the existing unlock and error path puts. The two callers that already hold the refcount tree lock keep their borrowed lookup behavior and do not acquire an extra reference.
KASAN report as below:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888117212820 by task python3/497
[Kernel and hardware identification omitted.]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
print_report+0xce/0x630
? ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420
? ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
? ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0
ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0
? __pfx_ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x3b6/0xd90
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x28d/0x610
? ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x3b6/0xd90
ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x410/0xd90
? __pfx_ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10
? down_write+0x11a/0x1f0
? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10
? ocfs2_inode_unlock+0x1a9/0x260
? __pfx_ocfs2_inode_unlock+0x10/0x10
? ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x1413/0x1d30
ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x157b/0x1d30
? __pfx_ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x10/0x10
? lock_acquire+0x190/0x300
? __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x1b7/0x220
? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? security_file_permission+0x26/0x80
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100
vfs_write+0x639/0x1010
? __pfx_ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x10/0x10
? lock_vma_under_rcu+0x154/0x4a0
? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10
? lock_release+0x121/0x290
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
__x64_sys_pwrite64+0x1b7/0x220
? __pfx___x64_sys_pwrite64+0x10/0x10
? irqentry_exit+0xbe/0x820
---truncated---
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99429"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:17:56Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2: pin refcount trees before dropping the lookup lock\n\nA refcount tree returned to ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree() must stay alive\nuntil that caller releases its operation reference. However,\nocfs2_get_refcount_tree() returns the cached pointer after dropping\nosb_lock, and the caller only takes its kref afterwards. The registry\nreference does not protect this gap from concurrent removal.\n\nThis can happen when another node frees a refcount root and reuses its\nblock with a different generation while this mount retains the old\ncached tree. Two local operations on different inodes sharing the new\nroot, such as data CoW and an external xattr update, can then look up\nthe same stale tree. Their inode locks are independent, and both the\nREFCOUNT DLM lock and rf_sem are acquired after the first operation\nreference.\n\nThe following ordering is possible, with no other operation references:\n\n Data CoW Xattr update\n -------- ------------\n Look up the old tree under\n osb_lock, then drop osb_lock\n Look up the same tree and take a kref\n Acquire the tree locks and read the\n new on-disk generation\n Erase the old tree under osb_lock\n Unlock and drop the operation kref\n Drop the registry kref, freeing tree\n Take a kref through the\n freed tree pointer\n\nThe final kref_get() accesses freed rf_getcnt storage, and subsequent\naccesses in ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree() also use the freed allocation.\n\nTake the operation reference in ocfs2_get_refcount_tree() before\nreleasing osb_lock, including when an insertion loses to another lookup.\nRemoval must acquire the same lock, so it cannot drop the registry\nreference before the lookup has pinned the tree. Keep the existing\nunlock and error path puts. The two callers that already hold the\nrefcount tree lock keep their borrowed lookup behavior and do not\nacquire an extra reference.\n\nKASAN report as below:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0\n Read of size 4 at addr ffff888117212820 by task python3/497\n\n[Kernel and hardware identification omitted.]\n\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0\n print_report+0xce/0x630\n ? ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420\n ? ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0\n kasan_report+0xe0/0x110\n ? ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0\n ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0\n ? __pfx_ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x10/0x10\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x3b6/0xd90\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x28d/0x610\n ? ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x3b6/0xd90\n ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x410/0xd90\n ? __pfx_ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10\n ? down_write+0x11a/0x1f0\n ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10\n ? ocfs2_inode_unlock+0x1a9/0x260\n ? __pfx_ocfs2_inode_unlock+0x10/0x10\n ? ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x1413/0x1d30\n ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x157b/0x1d30\n ? __pfx_ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x10/0x10\n ? lock_acquire+0x190/0x300\n ? __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x1b7/0x220\n ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? security_file_permission+0x26/0x80\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100\n vfs_write+0x639/0x1010\n ? __pfx_ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x10/0x10\n ? lock_vma_under_rcu+0x154/0x4a0\n ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10\n ? lock_release+0x121/0x290\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x1b7/0x220\n ? __pfx___x64_sys_pwrite64+0x10/0x10\n ? irqentry_exit+0xbe/0x820\n---truncated---",
"id": "GHSA-h5jv-8253-3cfr",
"modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:24Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T15:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99429"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2d9e864c234469dc7f56ea974f8269d251441e6a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ff4f020f7b03fddd529735f0b61ac0a8dd92c9e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c714a074074af7ae59233c1fa6ef9d7aa710462"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce7b46556af15642a1e9f8d0c596022dd7cfb4a7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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