GHSA-H5GR-WX7G-829Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-01 09:30 – Updated: 2025-12-12 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: gen_estimator: fix est_timer() vs CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y
syzbot reported a WARNING in est_timer() [1]
Problem here is that with CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y, timer callbacks can be preempted.
Adopt preempt_disable_nested()/preempt_enable_nested() to fix this.
[1] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 16 at ./include/linux/seqlock.h:221 _seqprop_assert include/linux/seqlock.h:221 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 16 at ./include/linux/seqlock.h:221 est_timer+0x6dc/0x9f0 net/core/gen_estimator.c:93 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ktimers/0 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT{RT,(full)} Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025 RIP: 0010:__seqprop_assert include/linux/seqlock.h:221 [inline] RIP: 0010:est_timer+0x6dc/0x9f0 net/core/gen_estimator.c:93 Call Trace: call_timer_fn+0x17e/0x5f0 kernel/time/timer.c:1747 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1798 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:2372 [inline] __run_timer_base+0x648/0x970 kernel/time/timer.c:2384 run_timer_base kernel/time/timer.c:2393 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0xb7/0x180 kernel/time/timer.c:2403 handle_softirqs+0x22c/0x710 kernel/softirq.c:579 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:613 [inline] run_ktimerd+0xcf/0x190 kernel/softirq.c:1043 smpboot_thread_fn+0x53f/0xa60 kernel/smpboot.c:160 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-39900"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-01T08:15:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet_sched: gen_estimator: fix est_timer() vs CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y\n\nsyzbot reported a WARNING in est_timer() [1]\n\nProblem here is that with CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y, timer callbacks\ncan be preempted.\n\nAdopt preempt_disable_nested()/preempt_enable_nested() to fix this.\n\n[1]\n WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 16 at ./include/linux/seqlock.h:221 __seqprop_assert include/linux/seqlock.h:221 [inline]\n WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 16 at ./include/linux/seqlock.h:221 est_timer+0x6dc/0x9f0 net/core/gen_estimator.c:93\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16 Comm: ktimers/0 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)}\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025\n RIP: 0010:__seqprop_assert include/linux/seqlock.h:221 [inline]\n RIP: 0010:est_timer+0x6dc/0x9f0 net/core/gen_estimator.c:93\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n call_timer_fn+0x17e/0x5f0 kernel/time/timer.c:1747\n expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1798 [inline]\n __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:2372 [inline]\n __run_timer_base+0x648/0x970 kernel/time/timer.c:2384\n run_timer_base kernel/time/timer.c:2393 [inline]\n run_timer_softirq+0xb7/0x180 kernel/time/timer.c:2403\n handle_softirqs+0x22c/0x710 kernel/softirq.c:579\n __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:613 [inline]\n run_ktimerd+0xcf/0x190 kernel/softirq.c:1043\n smpboot_thread_fn+0x53f/0xa60 kernel/smpboot.c:160\n kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463\n ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245\n \u003c/TASK\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-h5gr-wx7g-829q",
"modified": "2025-12-12T21:31:33Z",
"published": "2025-10-01T09:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39900"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f74c0ea9b26d1505d55b61e36b1623dd347e1d1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a22ec2ee824be30803068a52f78f7ffe3bc879fb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e79923824c48b930609680be04cb29253fc4a17d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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