GHSA-H5F8-CRRQ-4PW8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-28 14:40 – Updated: 2025-05-28 14:40Impact
When the Contrast initializer is configured with a CONTRAST_LOG_LEVEL of info or debug, the workload secret is logged to stderr and written to Kubernetes logs.
Since info is the default setting, this affects all Contrast installations that don't customize their initializers' log level.
The following audiences are intended to have access to workload secrets (see https://docs.edgeless.systems/contrast/1.7/architecture/secrets#workload-secrets):
- Contrast Coordinator (can derive all workload secrets)
- Contrast Initializer (obtains only the secret configured in the manifest)
- Seedshare owner (can derive all workload secrets)
- Workload owner (can update manifests to obtain secrets)
This vulnerability allows the following parties unintended access to workload secrets issued by a Coordinator:
- Kubernetes users with
getorlistpermission onpods/logs. - Others with read access to the Kubernetes log storage (most notably, the cloud provider).
This vulnerability does not affect scenarios where workload secrets are not used by the application (directly or with secure persistence). Applications designed for workload owner exclusion can't use workload secrets and are thus unaffected.
Patches
N/A
Workarounds
This vulnerability can be mitigated by adding an environment variable CONTRAST_LOG_LEVEL=warn to the initializer after running contrast generate, and then running contrast generate again.
References
N/A
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.8.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/edgelesssys/contrast"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.8.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-532"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-05-28T14:40:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nWhen the Contrast initializer is configured with a `CONTRAST_LOG_LEVEL` of `info` or `debug`, the workload secret is logged to `stderr` and written to Kubernetes logs. \n\nSince `info` is the default setting, this affects all Contrast installations that don\u0027t customize their initializers\u0027 log level.\n\nThe following audiences are **intended** to have access to workload secrets (see https://docs.edgeless.systems/contrast/1.7/architecture/secrets#workload-secrets):\n\n* Contrast Coordinator (can derive all workload secrets)\n* Contrast Initializer (obtains only the secret configured in the manifest)\n* Seedshare owner (can derive all workload secrets)\n* Workload owner (can update manifests to obtain secrets)\n\nThis vulnerability allows the following parties **unintended access** to workload secrets issued by a Coordinator:\n\n* Kubernetes users with `get` or `list` permission on `pods/logs`.\n* Others with read access to the Kubernetes log storage (most notably, the cloud provider).\n\nThis vulnerability **does not affect** scenarios where workload secrets are not used by the application (directly or with [secure persistence](https://docs.edgeless.systems/contrast/1.7/architecture/secrets#secure-persistence)). Applications designed for workload owner exclusion can\u0027t use workload secrets and are thus unaffected.\n\n### Patches\n\nN/A\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThis vulnerability can be mitigated by adding an environment variable `CONTRAST_LOG_LEVEL=warn` to the initializer after running `contrast generate`, and then running `contrast generate` again.\n\n### References\n\nN/A",
"id": "GHSA-h5f8-crrq-4pw8",
"modified": "2025-05-28T14:40:25Z",
"published": "2025-05-28T14:40:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast/security/advisories/GHSA-h5f8-crrq-4pw8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Contrast workload secrets leak to logs on INFO level"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.