Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-H53F-RM2W-W7RG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-23 20:50 – Updated: 2026-10-28 19:04

Summary

Echo: X-Real-IP extractor trusts the header value instead of the sending peer

Details

Impact

In Echo v5, ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader checked whether the address supplied in X-Real-IP belonged to a trusted range instead of checking the address of the direct network peer. An untrusted client could therefore supply a loopback or private address and have it returned by c.RealIP() with the extractor's default trust options.

Applications using this extractor for IP allowlists, IP-based rate limiting, audit logs or forwarding headers could accept a spoofed client identity. Exploitation requires that the attacker can reach Echo directly or that an intervening proxy passes through the attacker's X-Real-IP value. Applications using the default direct IP extractor are unaffected. Echo v4 is unaffected by this v5 regression.

Affected versions and patch

All v5 releases from v5.0.0 through v5.4.0 are affected. Upgrade to v5.4.1.

The patch validates the direct peer before accepting a syntactically valid X-Real-IP value, restoring the v4 trust model. Fix commit.

Workarounds

Use ExtractIPDirect until upgrading, or ensure that only trusted proxies can reach Echo and that they replace client-supplied forwarding headers. Configure trusted proxy ranges narrowly for the deployment.

Credits

Reported and patched by @rm-Umar. @Duodum independently reported the same issue in GHSA-c3r7-8j36-7mx8, which is tracked as a duplicate of this advisory.

Severity

5.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/labstack/echo/v5"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.4.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-118265"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-348"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-23T20:50:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n\nIn Echo v5, `ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader` checked whether the address supplied in `X-Real-IP` belonged to a trusted range instead of checking the address of the direct network peer. An untrusted client could therefore supply a loopback or private address and have it returned by `c.RealIP()` with the extractor\u0027s default trust options.\n\nApplications using this extractor for IP allowlists, IP-based rate limiting, audit logs or forwarding headers could accept a spoofed client identity. Exploitation requires that the attacker can reach Echo directly or that an intervening proxy passes through the attacker\u0027s `X-Real-IP` value. Applications using the default direct IP extractor are unaffected. Echo v4 is unaffected by this v5 regression.\n\n## Affected versions and patch\n\nAll v5 releases from v5.0.0 through v5.4.0 are affected. Upgrade to [v5.4.1](https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.1).\n\nThe patch validates the direct peer before accepting a syntactically valid `X-Real-IP` value, restoring the v4 trust model. [Fix commit](https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/1855061e572ae9dab727c811d8382f266bfbaaec).\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUse `ExtractIPDirect` until upgrading, or ensure that only trusted proxies can reach Echo and that they replace client-supplied forwarding headers. Configure trusted proxy ranges narrowly for the deployment.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported and patched by @rm-Umar. @Duodum independently reported the same issue in GHSA-c3r7-8j36-7mx8, which is tracked as a duplicate of this advisory.",
  "id": "GHSA-h53f-rm2w-w7rg",
  "modified": "2026-10-28T19:04:04Z",
  "published": "2026-10-23T20:50:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-h53f-rm2w-w7rg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/1855061e572ae9dab727c811d8382f266bfbaaec"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Echo: X-Real-IP extractor trusts the header value instead of the sending peer"
}

CVE-2026-118265 (GCVE-0-2026-118265)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-28 19:03 – Updated: 2026-10-29 20:54

Title

Echo: X-Real-IP extractor trusts the header value instead of the sending peer

Summary

Echo is a Go web framework. From 5.0.0 until 5.4.1, Echo v5's ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader validates whether the client-supplied X-Real-IP value belongs to a trusted range instead of validating the direct network peer. A client reaching Echo directly, or through a proxy that preserves the header, can supply a loopback or private address and have Context.RealIP return that spoofed identity. Applications using the extractor for IP allowlists, rate limiting, audit logs, or forwarding headers can consequently trust an attacker-controlled address; the default direct extractor and Echo v4 are unaffected. This issue is fixed in 5.4.1.

Severity

5.3 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-10-29 15:43 UTC

CWE

CWE-348 - Use of Less Trusted Source

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 8044 records in the last 180 days details

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/labstack/echo/security/advisor…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/1855061e5…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.1	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
labstack	echo	Affected: >= 5.0.0, < 5.4.1

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-118265",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-10-29T15:43:31.934498Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-10-29T20:54:10.718Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "echo",
          "vendor": "labstack",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 5.0.0, \u003c 5.4.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Echo is a Go web framework. From 5.0.0 until 5.4.1, Echo v5\u0027s ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader validates whether the client-supplied X-Real-IP value belongs to a trusted range instead of validating the direct network peer. A client reaching Echo directly, or through a proxy that preserves the header, can supply a loopback or private address and have Context.RealIP return that spoofed identity. Applications using the extractor for IP allowlists, rate limiting, audit logs, or forwarding headers can consequently trust an attacker-controlled address; the default direct extractor and Echo v4 are unaffected. This issue is fixed in 5.4.1."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 5.3,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-348",
              "description": "CWE-348: Use of Less Trusted Source",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-28T19:03:56.934Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-h53f-rm2w-w7rg",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-h53f-rm2w-w7rg"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/1855061e572ae9dab727c811d8382f266bfbaae",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/1855061e572ae9dab727c811d8382f266bfbaae"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.1",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.1"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-h53f-rm2w-w7rg",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Echo: X-Real-IP extractor trusts the header value instead of the sending peer"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-118265",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-28T19:03:56.934Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-27T20:13:55.314Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-29T20:54:10.718Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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