GHSA-H4JJ-WP3V-M7X9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:44 – Updated: 2024-04-04 00:07The Plum Compass Android device with a build fingerprint of PLUM/c179_hwf_221/c179_hwf_221:6.0/MRA58K/W16.51.5-22:user/release-keys contains a pre-installed platform app with a package name of com.android.settings (versionCode=23, versionName=6.0-eng.root.20161223.224055) that contains an exported broadcast receiver app component which allows any app co-located on the device to programmatically perform a factory reset. In addition, the app initiating the factory reset does not require any permissions. A factory reset will remove all user data and apps from the device. This will result in the loss of any data that have not been backed up or synced externally. The capability to perform a factory reset is not directly available to third-party apps (those that the user installs themselves with the exception of enabled Mobile Device Management (MDM) apps), although this capability can be obtained by leveraging an unprotected app component of a pre-installed platform app.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-14989"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-04-25T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Plum Compass Android device with a build fingerprint of PLUM/c179_hwf_221/c179_hwf_221:6.0/MRA58K/W16.51.5-22:user/release-keys contains a pre-installed platform app with a package name of com.android.settings (versionCode=23, versionName=6.0-eng.root.20161223.224055) that contains an exported broadcast receiver app component which allows any app co-located on the device to programmatically perform a factory reset. In addition, the app initiating the factory reset does not require any permissions. A factory reset will remove all user data and apps from the device. This will result in the loss of any data that have not been backed up or synced externally. The capability to perform a factory reset is not directly available to third-party apps (those that the user installs themselves with the exception of enabled Mobile Device Management (MDM) apps), although this capability can be obtained by leveraging an unprotected app component of a pre-installed platform app.",
"id": "GHSA-h4jj-wp3v-m7x9",
"modified": "2024-04-04T00:07:16Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:44:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14989"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.kryptowire.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.kryptowire.com/portal/android-firmware-defcon-2018"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.kryptowire.com/portal/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/DEFCON-26-Johnson-and-Stavrou-Vulnerable-Out-of-the-Box-An-Eval-of-Android-Carrier-Devices-WP-Updated.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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