GHSA-H4GF-5W5M-M3J2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-24 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: flush pending RCU callbacks on module unload
Call rcu_barrier() in module exit to wait for outstanding call_rcu() callbacks before freeing module text, preventing late callback execution in freed memory.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc1d59c40 PGD 6a12067 P4D 6a12067 PUD 6a14067 PMD 13698b067 PTE 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:0xffffffffc1d59c40 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffc1d59c16. RSP: 0018:ffffc900198c0f28 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: ffffffffc1d59c40 RBX: ffff897c7d6b61c0 RCX: ffff88826aff4590 RDX: ffff8884d8b35490 RSI: ffffc900198c0f30 RDI: ffff88812af67290 RBP: 000000000000000a (DONE segment entries) R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000100 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff82a06100 R12: ffff88811a4e3700 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff897c7d6b6270 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff897c7d680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffc1d59c16 CR3: 00000104a980a001 CR4: 0000000002770ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: ? rcu_do_batch+0x163/0x450 ? rcu_core+0x177/0x1c0 ? __do_softirq+0xc1/0x280 ? asm_call_irq_on_stack+0xf/0x20 ? do_softirq_own_stack+0x37/0x50 ? irq_exit_rcu+0xc4/0x100 ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x36/0x80 ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 ? cpuidle_enter_state+0xd4/0x360 ? cpuidle_enter+0x29/0x40 ? cpuidle_idle_call+0x108/0x1a0 ? do_idle+0x77/0xf0 ? cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20 ? secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xbf/0xcb
(cherry picked from commit feaa5039f6c12acc9aa934c2d45dcd251a12c69f)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93809"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T17:17:13Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amdgpu: flush pending RCU callbacks on module unload\n\nCall rcu_barrier() in module exit to wait for outstanding call_rcu() callbacks\nbefore freeing module text, preventing late callback execution in freed memory.\n\nBUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc1d59c40\nPGD 6a12067 P4D 6a12067 PUD 6a14067 PMD 13698b067 PTE 0\nOops: 0010 [#1] SMP NOPTI\nRIP: 0010:0xffffffffc1d59c40\nCode: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffc1d59c16.\nRSP: 0018:ffffc900198c0f28 EFLAGS: 00010286\nRAX: ffffffffc1d59c40 RBX: ffff897c7d6b61c0 RCX: ffff88826aff4590\nRDX: ffff8884d8b35490 RSI: ffffc900198c0f30 RDI: ffff88812af67290\nRBP: 000000000000000a (DONE segment entries) R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000100\nR10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff82a06100 R12: ffff88811a4e3700\nR13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff897c7d6b6270 R15: 0000000000000000\nFS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff897c7d680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: ffffffffc1d59c16 CR3: 00000104a980a001 CR4: 0000000002770ee0\nDR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\nDR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400\nPKRU: 55555554\nCall Trace:\n \u003cIRQ\u003e\n ? rcu_do_batch+0x163/0x450\n ? rcu_core+0x177/0x1c0\n ? __do_softirq+0xc1/0x280\n ? asm_call_irq_on_stack+0xf/0x20\n \u003c/IRQ\u003e\n ? do_softirq_own_stack+0x37/0x50\n ? irq_exit_rcu+0xc4/0x100\n ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x36/0x80\n ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20\n ? cpuidle_enter_state+0xd4/0x360\n ? cpuidle_enter+0x29/0x40\n ? cpuidle_idle_call+0x108/0x1a0\n ? do_idle+0x77/0xf0\n ? cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20\n ? secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xbf/0xcb\n\n(cherry picked from commit feaa5039f6c12acc9aa934c2d45dcd251a12c69f)",
"id": "GHSA-h4gf-5w5m-m3j2",
"modified": "2026-09-24T18:31:30Z",
"published": "2026-09-24T18:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93809"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/27d43ad57759c73b8fad5b2bad62a0616e116bbc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5063ae84c45299a100bf1d6ed11945f688063649"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67a654b41cfa73c3b83402c4a01b2689cad5b9bc"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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