GHSA-H3W5-2JVM-GF7P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-09-25 09:31The Automation Web Platform – Notifications and OTP for WooCommerce, Advanced Country Code plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.8.6. This is due to missing permission enforcement on the publicly accessible REST route POST /wp-json/wawp/v1/signup/<op> and the absence of a key allowlist in the finish_registration_logic function, which copies the attacker-controlled wawp_custom_fields parameter directly into update_user_meta() — allowing sensitive meta keys such as wp_capabilities and wp_user_level to be set by the caller. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to register a new account with the administrator role and gain full administrative access to the site. When OTP verification is enabled at signup, the OTP session token (otp_transient) is returned in plaintext in the HTTP response body, and the handle_magic_link_request() handler marks that token as verified on any unauthenticated GET request containing it without ever checking the OTP code value — making the OTP step trivially bypassable with no inbox or SMS access required.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-14281"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T07:16:53Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The Automation Web Platform \u2013 Notifications and OTP for WooCommerce, Advanced Country Code plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.8.6. This is due to missing permission enforcement on the publicly accessible REST route `POST /wp-json/wawp/v1/signup/\u003cop\u003e` and the absence of a key allowlist in the `finish_registration_logic` function, which copies the attacker-controlled `wawp_custom_fields` parameter directly into `update_user_meta()` \u2014 allowing sensitive meta keys such as `wp_capabilities` and `wp_user_level` to be set by the caller. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to register a new account with the administrator role and gain full administrative access to the site. When OTP verification is enabled at signup, the OTP session token (`otp_transient`) is returned in plaintext in the HTTP response body, and the `handle_magic_link_request()` handler marks that token as verified on any unauthenticated GET request containing it without ever checking the OTP code value \u2014 making the OTP step trivially bypassable with no inbox or SMS access required.",
"id": "GHSA-h3w5-2jvm-gf7p",
"modified": "2026-09-25T09:31:04Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T09:31:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14281"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/automation-web-platform/tags/4.8.6/includes/api/class-wawp-rest-settings-api.php#L342"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/automation-web-platform/tags/4.8.6/includes/api/class-wawp-rest-settings-api.php#L574"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/automation-web-platform/tags/4.8.6/includes/auth-services/class-wawp-otp-service.php#L477"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/automation-web-platform/tags/4.8.6/includes/auth-services/class-wawp-otp-service.php#L787"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/automation-web-platform/tags/4.8.6/includes/auth-services/class-wawp-signup.php#L1002"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/automation-web-platform/tags/4.8.6/includes/auth-services/class-wawp-signup.php#L845"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/automation-web-platform/trunk/includes/api/class-wawp-rest-settings-api.php#L342"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/automation-web-platform/trunk/includes/api/class-wawp-rest-settings-api.php#L574"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/automation-web-platform/trunk/includes/auth-services/class-wawp-otp-service.php#L477"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/automation-web-platform/trunk/includes/auth-services/class-wawp-otp-service.php#L787"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/automation-web-platform/trunk/includes/auth-services/class-wawp-signup.php#L1002"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/automation-web-platform/trunk/includes/auth-services/class-wawp-signup.php#L845"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3679350%40automation-web-platform\u0026new=3679350%40automation-web-platform"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/f17d3e43-29c6-4c80-912d-53ceda3fcb5d?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.