GHSA-H2XV-X4XQ-MHH8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
svcrdma: Use svc_xprt_put to free listener on create failure
svc_rdma_create() calls kfree(cma_xprt) when svc_rdma_create_listen_id() fails. svc_xprt_init() has already acquired a net namespace reference via get_net_track(); kfree bypasses svc_xprt_free() which releases it.
Replace the kfree() with svc_xprt_put() so the kref_init birth reference drops to zero and svc_xprt_free() dispatches svc_rdma_free() to clean up properly. sc_cm_id is still NULL at that point; the preceding patch added the necessary NULL guard in svc_rdma_free().
svc_xprt_free() also drops the module reference via module_put(), but the caller _svc_xprt_create() does the same on xpo_create failure, double-putting the single try_module_get() it acquired. Take a compensating __module_get() before the svc_xprt_put() to keep the count balanced, matching the convention in svc_rdma_accept()'s error path.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89527"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:35Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsvcrdma: Use svc_xprt_put to free listener on create failure\n\nsvc_rdma_create() calls kfree(cma_xprt) when\nsvc_rdma_create_listen_id() fails. svc_xprt_init() has already\nacquired a net namespace reference via get_net_track(); kfree\nbypasses svc_xprt_free() which releases it.\n\nReplace the kfree() with svc_xprt_put() so the kref_init birth\nreference drops to zero and svc_xprt_free() dispatches\nsvc_rdma_free() to clean up properly. sc_cm_id is still NULL\nat that point; the preceding patch added the necessary NULL\nguard in svc_rdma_free().\n\nsvc_xprt_free() also drops the module reference via\nmodule_put(), but the caller _svc_xprt_create() does the same\non xpo_create failure, double-putting the single\ntry_module_get() it acquired. Take a compensating\n__module_get() before the svc_xprt_put() to keep the count\nbalanced, matching the convention in svc_rdma_accept()\u0027s error\npath.",
"id": "GHSA-h2xv-x4xq-mhh8",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:20Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89527"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e35ec558b8cece9399a50141ecaeadbdb8768dc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31b8293495ba94ccf494e556a318886b716884b6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac1dd6002f758ab7dd3e737757e5a1bb1c0b38d6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e346ef7bcb137f50c49f969330ab7dcf64ea1654"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e68380710fc970e07610b2f42594575ad35fdb1c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee70d690b5544b736706a9a5796aafb634013f54"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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