GHSA-H2FJ-CF53-2C8Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-25 15:30 – Updated: 2026-03-25 21:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xhci: sideband: don't dereference freed ring when removing sideband endpoint
xhci_sideband_remove_endpoint() incorrecly assumes that the endpoint is running and has a valid transfer ring.
Lianqin reported a crash during suspend/wake-up stress testing, and found the cause to be dereferencing a non-existing transfer ring 'ep->ring' during xhci_sideband_remove_endpoint().
The endpoint and its ring may be in unknown state if this function is called after xHCI was reinitialized in resume (lost power), or if device is being re-enumerated, disconnected or endpoint already dropped.
Fix this by both removing unnecessary ring access, and by checking ep->ring exists before dereferencing it. Also make sure endpoint is running before attempting to stop it.
Remove the xhci_initialize_ring_info() call during sideband endpoint removal as is it only initializes ring structure enqueue, dequeue and cycle state values to their starting values without changing actual hardware enqueue, dequeue and cycle state. Leaving them out of sync is worse than leaving it as it is. The endpoint will get freed in after this in most usecases.
If the (audio) class driver want's to reuse the endpoint after offload then it is up to the class driver to ensure endpoint is properly set up.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23009"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-25T15:15:55Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxhci: sideband: don\u0027t dereference freed ring when removing sideband endpoint\n\nxhci_sideband_remove_endpoint() incorrecly assumes that the endpoint is\nrunning and has a valid transfer ring.\n\nLianqin reported a crash during suspend/wake-up stress testing, and\nfound the cause to be dereferencing a non-existing transfer ring\n\u0027ep-\u003ering\u0027 during xhci_sideband_remove_endpoint().\n\nThe endpoint and its ring may be in unknown state if this function\nis called after xHCI was reinitialized in resume (lost power), or if\ndevice is being re-enumerated, disconnected or endpoint already dropped.\n\nFix this by both removing unnecessary ring access, and by checking\nep-\u003ering exists before dereferencing it. Also make sure endpoint is\nrunning before attempting to stop it.\n\nRemove the xhci_initialize_ring_info() call during sideband endpoint\nremoval as is it only initializes ring structure enqueue, dequeue and\ncycle state values to their starting values without changing actual\nhardware enqueue, dequeue and cycle state. Leaving them out of sync\nis worse than leaving it as it is. The endpoint will get freed in after\nthis in most usecases.\n\nIf the (audio) class driver want\u0027s to reuse the endpoint after offload\nthen it is up to the class driver to ensure endpoint is properly set up.",
"id": "GHSA-h2fj-cf53-2c8q",
"modified": "2026-03-25T21:30:23Z",
"published": "2026-01-25T15:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23009"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/34f6634dba87ef72b3c3a3a524be663adef7ab42"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd83dc1249737b837ac5d57c81f2b0977c613d9f"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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