GHSA-H24C-6P6P-M3VX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-01 20:51 – Updated: 2023-09-01 20:51Impact
The specification of the GG18 threshold ECDSA signature protocol contains a vulnerability allowing an attacker to recover the shared secret key. If a participant generates a Paillier modulus N containing small factors (less than 2^100) they can interact with other participants in the signing protocol to steal their secret key shares in as little as sixteen signing attempts. The master key can then be reconstructed from these shares.
Patches
The implementation of GG18 in tss-lib did not prove that N is biprime or that it doesn't contain small factors. The fixed implementation adds the following proofs from the CGGMP21 threshold ECDSA protocol to the key generation:
- Paillier-Blum Modulus (
Nis the product of two primes) - No Small Factor (both factors of
Nare greater than2^256)
These proofs apply to both the Paillier encryption modulus N, and the modulus NTilde used in MTA proofs.
To address the issue in the resharing protocol, an additional round has been added to the end so that participants can confirm that they received valid proofs.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/bnb-chain/tss-lib"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.3.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-09-01T20:51:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe specification of the GG18 threshold ECDSA signature protocol contains a vulnerability allowing an attacker to recover the shared secret key. If a participant generates a Paillier modulus `N` containing small factors (less than `2^100`) they can interact with other participants in the signing protocol to steal their secret key shares in as little as sixteen signing attempts. The master key can then be reconstructed from these shares.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe implementation of GG18 in tss-lib did not prove that `N` is biprime or that it doesn\u0027t contain small factors. The fixed implementation adds the following proofs from the CGGMP21 threshold ECDSA protocol to the key generation:\n\n- Paillier-Blum Modulus (`N` is the product of two primes)\n- No Small Factor (both factors of `N` are greater than `2^256`)\n\nThese proofs apply to both the Paillier encryption modulus `N`, and the modulus `NTilde` used in MTA proofs.\n\nTo address the issue in the resharing protocol, an additional round has been added to the end so that participants can confirm that they received valid proofs.\n\n### References\n\n- [GG18](https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/114)\n- [CGGMP21](https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/060)",
"id": "GHSA-h24c-6p6p-m3vx",
"modified": "2023-09-01T20:51:05Z",
"published": "2023-09-01T20:51:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/threshold-network/tss-lib/security/advisories/GHSA-h24c-6p6p-m3vx"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/threshold-network/tss-lib/commit/2e712689cfbeefede15f95a0ec7112227d86f702"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/114"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/060"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/threshold-network/tss-lib"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "tss-lib leaks secret keys in response to incorrectly constructed Paillier moduli"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.