GHSA-GXR9-XC6P-VJJW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-11 18:35 – Updated: 2026-05-12 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: endpoint: Fix configfs group list head handling
Doing a list_del() on the epf_group field of struct pci_epf_driver in pci_epf_remove_cfs() is not correct as this field is a list head, not a list entry. This list_del() call triggers a KASAN warning when an endpoint function driver which has a configfs attribute group is torn down:
================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pci_epf_remove_cfs+0x17c/0x198 Write of size 8 at addr ffff00010f4a0d80 by task rmmod/319
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 319 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.16.0-rc2 #1 NONE Hardware name: Radxa ROCK 5B (DT) Call trace: show_stack+0x2c/0x84 (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x98 print_report+0x17c/0x538 kasan_report+0xb8/0x190 __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x20/0x2c pci_epf_remove_cfs+0x17c/0x198 pci_epf_unregister_driver+0x18/0x30 nvmet_pci_epf_cleanup_module+0x24/0x30 [nvmet_pci_epf] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x264/0x424 invoke_syscall+0x70/0x260 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xac/0x230 do_el0_svc+0x40/0x58 el0_svc+0x48/0xdc el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c ...
Remove this incorrect list_del() call from pci_epf_remove_cfs().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-39783"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-787"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-11T17:15:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nPCI: endpoint: Fix configfs group list head handling\n\nDoing a list_del() on the epf_group field of struct pci_epf_driver in\npci_epf_remove_cfs() is not correct as this field is a list head, not\na list entry. This list_del() call triggers a KASAN warning when an\nendpoint function driver which has a configfs attribute group is torn\ndown:\n\n==================================================================\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pci_epf_remove_cfs+0x17c/0x198\nWrite of size 8 at addr ffff00010f4a0d80 by task rmmod/319\n\nCPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 319 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.16.0-rc2 #1 NONE\nHardware name: Radxa ROCK 5B (DT)\nCall trace:\nshow_stack+0x2c/0x84 (C)\ndump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x98\nprint_report+0x17c/0x538\nkasan_report+0xb8/0x190\n__asan_report_store8_noabort+0x20/0x2c\npci_epf_remove_cfs+0x17c/0x198\npci_epf_unregister_driver+0x18/0x30\nnvmet_pci_epf_cleanup_module+0x24/0x30 [nvmet_pci_epf]\n__arm64_sys_delete_module+0x264/0x424\ninvoke_syscall+0x70/0x260\nel0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xac/0x230\ndo_el0_svc+0x40/0x58\nel0_svc+0x48/0xdc\nel0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138\nel0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c\n...\n\nRemove this incorrect list_del() call from pci_epf_remove_cfs().",
"id": "GHSA-gxr9-xc6p-vjjw",
"modified": "2026-05-12T15:31:08Z",
"published": "2025-09-11T18:35:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39783"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-032379.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-082556.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0758862386f114d9ab1e23181461bd1e2e9ec4c6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/409af8b9f7b4f23cd0464e71c6cd6fe13c076ae2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6cf65505523224cab1449d726d2ce8180c2941ee"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80ea6e6904fb2ba4ccb5d909579988466ec65358"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a302bd89db35d8b7e279de4d2b41c16c7f191069"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d5aecddc3452371d9da82cdbb0c715812524b54b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d79123d79a8154b4318529b7b2ff7e15806f480b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc4ffbd571716ff3b171418fb03abe80e720a7b1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00007.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00008.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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