GHSA-GW6V-2949-7C2M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-17 15:31 – Updated: 2025-09-24 21:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: bridge: replace physindev with physinif in nf_bridge_info

An skb can be added to a neigh->arp_queue while waiting for an arp reply. Where original skb's skb->dev can be different to neigh's neigh->dev. For instance in case of bridging dnated skb from one veth to another, the skb would be added to a neigh->arp_queue of the bridge.

As skb->dev can be reset back to nf_bridge->physindev and used, and as there is no explicit mechanism that prevents this physindev from been freed under us (for instance neigh_flush_dev doesn't cleanup skbs from different device's neigh queue) we can crash on e.g. this stack:

arp_process neigh_update skb = __skb_dequeue(&neigh->arp_queue) neigh_resolve_output(..., skb) ... br_nf_dev_xmit br_nf_pre_routing_finish_bridge_slow skb->dev = nf_bridge->physindev br_handle_frame_finish

Let's use plain ifindex instead of net_device link. To peek into the original net_device we will use dev_get_by_index_rcu(). Thus either we get device and are safe to use it or we don't get it and drop skb.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-35839"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-17T15:15:21Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: bridge: replace physindev with physinif in nf_bridge_info\n\nAn skb can be added to a neigh-\u003earp_queue while waiting for an arp\nreply. Where original skb\u0027s skb-\u003edev can be different to neigh\u0027s\nneigh-\u003edev. For instance in case of bridging dnated skb from one veth to\nanother, the skb would be added to a neigh-\u003earp_queue of the bridge.\n\nAs skb-\u003edev can be reset back to nf_bridge-\u003ephysindev and used, and as\nthere is no explicit mechanism that prevents this physindev from been\nfreed under us (for instance neigh_flush_dev doesn\u0027t cleanup skbs from\ndifferent device\u0027s neigh queue) we can crash on e.g. this stack:\n\narp_process\n  neigh_update\n    skb = __skb_dequeue(\u0026neigh-\u003earp_queue)\n      neigh_resolve_output(..., skb)\n        ...\n          br_nf_dev_xmit\n            br_nf_pre_routing_finish_bridge_slow\n              skb-\u003edev = nf_bridge-\u003ephysindev\n              br_handle_frame_finish\n\nLet\u0027s use plain ifindex instead of net_device link. To peek into the\noriginal net_device we will use dev_get_by_index_rcu(). Thus either we\nget device and are safe to use it or we don\u0027t get it and drop skb.",
  "id": "GHSA-gw6v-2949-7c2m",
  "modified": "2025-09-24T21:30:29Z",
  "published": "2024-05-17T15:31:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35839"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/544add1f1cfb78c3dfa3e6edcf4668f6be5e730c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ae19ee81ca56b13c50a78de6c47d5b8fdc9d97b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9325e3188a9cf3f69fc6f32af59844bbc5b90547"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9874808878d9eed407e3977fd11fee49de1e1d86"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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