GHSA-GVRM-XH5G-W8V6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: xsk: Fix DMA and xdp_frame leak on XDP_TX xmit failure
In the XSK branch of mlx5e_xmit_xdp_buff(), when sq->xmit_xdp_frame() returns false (e.g. XDPSQ is full), the function returns without unmapping the DMA address or freeing the xdp_frame allocated by xdp_convert_zc_to_xdp_frame(). The xdpi_fifo push only happens on success, so the completion path cannot recover these entries.
With CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG=y, the leak surfaces on driver unbind:
DMA-API: pci 0000:08:00.0: device driver has pending DMA allocations while released from device [count=1116] One of leaked entries details: [device address=0x000000010ffd7028] [size=1534 bytes] [mapped with DMA_TO_DEVICE] [mapped as phy] WARNING: kernel/dma/debug.c:881 at dma_debug_device_change+0x127/0x180 ... DMA-API: Mapped at: debug_dma_map_phys+0x4b/0xd0 dma_map_phys+0xfd/0x2d0 mlx5e_xdp_handle+0x5ae/0xac0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_xsk_skb_from_cqe_mpwrq_linear+0xc4/0x170 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_handle_rx_cqe_mpwrq+0xc1/0x290 [mlx5_core]
Add the missing unmap + xdp_return_frame, matching the cleanup already done in mlx5e_xdp_xmit(). has_frags is rejected earlier in this branch, so no per-frag unmap is needed.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53229"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-401"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T09:16:40Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/mlx5e: xsk: Fix DMA and xdp_frame leak on XDP_TX xmit failure\n\nIn the XSK branch of mlx5e_xmit_xdp_buff(), when sq-\u003exmit_xdp_frame()\nreturns false (e.g. XDPSQ is full), the function returns without\nunmapping the DMA address or freeing the xdp_frame allocated by\nxdp_convert_zc_to_xdp_frame(). The xdpi_fifo push only happens on\nsuccess, so the completion path cannot recover these entries.\n\nWith CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG=y, the leak surfaces on driver unbind:\n\n DMA-API: pci 0000:08:00.0: device driver has pending DMA\n allocations while released from device [count=1116]\n One of leaked entries details: [device address=0x000000010ffd7028]\n [size=1534 bytes] [mapped with DMA_TO_DEVICE] [mapped as phy]\n WARNING: kernel/dma/debug.c:881 at dma_debug_device_change+0x127/0x180\n ...\n DMA-API: Mapped at:\n debug_dma_map_phys+0x4b/0xd0\n dma_map_phys+0xfd/0x2d0\n mlx5e_xdp_handle+0x5ae/0xac0 [mlx5_core]\n mlx5e_xsk_skb_from_cqe_mpwrq_linear+0xc4/0x170 [mlx5_core]\n mlx5e_handle_rx_cqe_mpwrq+0xc1/0x290 [mlx5_core]\n\nAdd the missing unmap + xdp_return_frame, matching the cleanup already\ndone in mlx5e_xdp_xmit(). has_frags is rejected earlier in this branch,\nso no per-frag unmap is needed.",
"id": "GHSA-gvrm-xh5g-w8v6",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:32:44Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T09:31:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53229"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0aabca726b43d833721034e97d99efcc8237b22a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2789b74ae1f4b68333c9d5eec2f3354d07b16e61"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3bad189a31eb78575ea69f093e8ef5b7e3e8c832"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b3eeba50fbc3b45f279037c29a87a90e8bac1e1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b69004f5a6ad32da84d8aa5b23b9c0caafe6252e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf0247d34d79d2740b3f1d6cc44dbd38ab2b169e"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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