GHSA-GVP8-978C-RX2Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-30 23:53 – Updated: 2026-09-30 23:53Summary
PyJWT.decode()/decode_complete() mutates a caller-supplied options dict in place whenever verify_signature is falsy, adding verify_exp/verify_nbf/verify_iat/verify_aud/verify_iss/verify_sub/verify_jti keys directly onto that object. If application code reuses the same options dict across calls (a config object, a module-level constant, a wrapper's self.options), a later call that explicitly sets verify_signature=True for a full, normal verification silently inherits the leftover verify_exp=False etc. from an earlier verify_signature=False call on the same object -- and accepts an expired, wrong-audience, wrong-issuer, or wrong-subject token as valid with no exception. Signature verification itself is unaffected; this is specifically a claims-check bypass.
This is a regression of an already-fixed, closed issue: originally reported in #679 (2021), fixed in #743 (2022, via a shallow copy of options), and silently reintroduced by #1045 (merged 2025-03-05, a typing/logic refactor that dropped the 2022 shallow-copy line). It has been present since #1045 merged, so it likely shipped in several releases already in the wild.
Details
File: jwt/api_jwt.py, PyJWT._merge_options() (called from decode_complete(), which backs both jwt.decode() and jwt.decode_complete()):
def _merge_options(self, options=None):
if options is None:
return self.options
if not options.get("verify_signature", True):
options["verify_exp"] = options.get("verify_exp", False)
options["verify_nbf"] = options.get("verify_nbf", False)
# ...5 more, same pattern -- all written directly onto the caller's dict
return {**self.options, **options}
No dict(options) copy occurs before these writes, unlike the pre-2025-03-05 code (see #743's fix, options = dict(options or {})). Confirmed via gh api repos/jpadilla/pyjwt/commits/29fbfc36 that #1045's diff removes that line. Confirmed still present on current main via a live fetch of jwt/api_jwt.py.
PoC
Two scripts, each run twice (separate processes), identical output both times (except Python object id()), saved locally and available on request:
import jwt, time
INSECURE_OPTIONS = {"verify_signature": False}
secret = "s3cr3t"
expired_token = jwt.encode(
{"exp": int(time.time()) - 3600, "data": "x"}, secret, algorithm="HS256"
)
jwt.decode(expired_token, options=INSECURE_OPTIONS)
print(INSECURE_OPTIONS)
# The dict has been silently mutated with 7 new keys, including verify_exp: False.
INSECURE_OPTIONS["verify_signature"] = True
result = jwt.decode(expired_token, secret, algorithms=["HS256"], options=INSECURE_OPTIONS)
print(result)
# No exception raised. Expected: jwt.ExpiredSignatureError, since verify_signature=True
# was explicitly requested on this call.
Reproduced deterministically across 2 independent process runs.
Impact
Preconditions: the calling application must reuse a mutable options dict object across two or more decode()/decode_complete() calls with different intent (e.g. one "insecure peek" call followed by a "fully verified" call on the same dict, config object, or instance attribute). This is a real, plausible pattern but not universal; it does not affect code that constructs a fresh options dict per call.
When triggered: a signed-but-expired (or wrong-aud/iss/sub/jti) token is silently accepted as fully verified, with no warning or exception. This is an authentication/claims-verification bypass, not a signature-verification bypass.
Scope: regression present since PR #1045 (merged 2025-03-05), affecting every PyJWT release since then up to and including the current 2.13.0.
Suggested fix: restore a shallow copy inside _merge_options() itself (rather than relying on a caller-side copy), so every caller of _merge_options is covered:
def _merge_options(self, options=None):
if options is None:
return self.options
options = dict(options) # never mutate the caller's dict
if not options.get("verify_signature", True):
options.setdefault("verify_exp", False)
options.setdefault("verify_nbf", False)
options.setdefault("verify_iat", False)
options.setdefault("verify_aud", False)
options.setdefault("verify_iss", False)
options.setdefault("verify_sub", False)
options.setdefault("verify_jti", False)
return {**self.options, **options}
Found via a property-based audit (copy/clone independence across widely-used Python libraries); both repro scripts were written and independently re-run before this report.
Maintainer update — 2026-09-08
We reproduced the reported behavior on PyJWT 2.13.0 at source SHA 7144e4534c34810f4525dc4578a32addd8212cff. A caller-supplied mutable options mapping was modified when verify_signature was false; reusing that mapping after re-enabling signature verification could leave registered-claim checks disabled. This is a conditional claim-verification bypass, not a signature-forgery issue.
A narrow fix has been prepared: PyJWT now copies the options mapping before applying defaults. Regression coverage includes decode(), decode_complete(), constructor input preservation, mutable-mapping compatibility, and reuse of an options mapping across verification modes. The focused tests pass, the full suite passes with 369 tests and 4 intentional cryptography-environment skips, and lint/format/type checks pass.
The advisory remains in triage while the fix goes through release planning. The independently verified range in this investigation is 2.13.0; reports of earlier affected versions should include the exact version and reproduction details.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "PyJWT"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.11.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.13.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-103001"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-471"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-30T23:53:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`PyJWT.decode()`/`decode_complete()` mutates a caller-supplied `options` dict in place whenever `verify_signature` is falsy, adding `verify_exp`/`verify_nbf`/`verify_iat`/`verify_aud`/`verify_iss`/`verify_sub`/`verify_jti` keys directly onto that object. If application code reuses the same `options` dict across calls (a config object, a module-level constant, a wrapper\u0027s `self.options`), a later call that explicitly sets `verify_signature=True` for a full, normal verification silently inherits the leftover `verify_exp=False` etc. from an earlier `verify_signature=False` call on the same object -- and accepts an expired, wrong-audience, wrong-issuer, or wrong-subject token as valid with no exception. Signature verification itself is unaffected; this is specifically a claims-check bypass.\n\nThis is a regression of an already-fixed, closed issue: originally reported in #679 (2021), fixed in #743 (2022, via a shallow copy of `options`), and silently reintroduced by #1045 (merged 2025-03-05, a typing/logic refactor that dropped the 2022 shallow-copy line). It has been present since #1045 merged, so it likely shipped in several releases already in the wild.\n\n### Details\n\nFile: `jwt/api_jwt.py`, `PyJWT._merge_options()` (called from `decode_complete()`, which backs both `jwt.decode()` and `jwt.decode_complete()`):\n\n```python\ndef _merge_options(self, options=None):\n if options is None:\n return self.options\n if not options.get(\"verify_signature\", True):\n options[\"verify_exp\"] = options.get(\"verify_exp\", False)\n options[\"verify_nbf\"] = options.get(\"verify_nbf\", False)\n # ...5 more, same pattern -- all written directly onto the caller\u0027s dict\n return {**self.options, **options}\n```\n\nNo `dict(options)` copy occurs before these writes, unlike the pre-2025-03-05 code (see #743\u0027s fix, `options = dict(options or {})`). Confirmed via `gh api repos/jpadilla/pyjwt/commits/29fbfc36` that #1045\u0027s diff removes that line. Confirmed still present on current `main` via a live fetch of `jwt/api_jwt.py`.\n\n### PoC\n\nTwo scripts, each run twice (separate processes), identical output both times (except Python object `id()`), saved locally and available on request:\n\n```python\nimport jwt, time\n\nINSECURE_OPTIONS = {\"verify_signature\": False}\n\nsecret = \"s3cr3t\"\nexpired_token = jwt.encode(\n {\"exp\": int(time.time()) - 3600, \"data\": \"x\"}, secret, algorithm=\"HS256\"\n)\n\njwt.decode(expired_token, options=INSECURE_OPTIONS)\nprint(INSECURE_OPTIONS)\n# The dict has been silently mutated with 7 new keys, including verify_exp: False.\n\nINSECURE_OPTIONS[\"verify_signature\"] = True\nresult = jwt.decode(expired_token, secret, algorithms=[\"HS256\"], options=INSECURE_OPTIONS)\nprint(result)\n# No exception raised. Expected: jwt.ExpiredSignatureError, since verify_signature=True\n# was explicitly requested on this call.\n```\n\nReproduced deterministically across 2 independent process runs.\n\n### Impact\n\nPreconditions: the calling application must reuse a mutable `options` dict object across two or more `decode()`/`decode_complete()` calls with different intent (e.g. one \"insecure peek\" call followed by a \"fully verified\" call on the same dict, config object, or instance attribute). This is a real, plausible pattern but not universal; it does not affect code that constructs a fresh `options` dict per call.\n\nWhen triggered: a signed-but-expired (or wrong-aud/iss/sub/jti) token is silently accepted as fully verified, with no warning or exception. This is an authentication/claims-verification bypass, not a signature-verification bypass.\n\nScope: regression present since PR #1045 (merged 2025-03-05), affecting every PyJWT release since then up to and including the current 2.13.0.\n\nSuggested fix: restore a shallow copy inside `_merge_options()` itself (rather than relying on a caller-side copy), so every caller of `_merge_options` is covered:\n\n```python\ndef _merge_options(self, options=None):\n if options is None:\n return self.options\n options = dict(options) # never mutate the caller\u0027s dict\n if not options.get(\"verify_signature\", True):\n options.setdefault(\"verify_exp\", False)\n options.setdefault(\"verify_nbf\", False)\n options.setdefault(\"verify_iat\", False)\n options.setdefault(\"verify_aud\", False)\n options.setdefault(\"verify_iss\", False)\n options.setdefault(\"verify_sub\", False)\n options.setdefault(\"verify_jti\", False)\n return {**self.options, **options}\n```\n\nFound via a property-based audit (copy/clone independence across widely-used Python libraries); both repro scripts were written and independently re-run before this report.\n\n## Maintainer update \u2014 2026-09-08\n\nWe reproduced the reported behavior on PyJWT 2.13.0 at source SHA `7144e4534c34810f4525dc4578a32addd8212cff`. A caller-supplied mutable `options` mapping was modified when `verify_signature` was false; reusing that mapping after re-enabling signature verification could leave registered-claim checks disabled. This is a conditional claim-verification bypass, not a signature-forgery issue.\n\nA narrow fix has been prepared: PyJWT now copies the options mapping before applying defaults. Regression coverage includes `decode()`, `decode_complete()`, constructor input preservation, mutable-mapping compatibility, and reuse of an options mapping across verification modes. The focused tests pass, the full suite passes with 369 tests and 4 intentional cryptography-environment skips, and lint/format/type checks pass.\n\nThe advisory remains in triage while the fix goes through release planning. The independently verified range in this investigation is 2.13.0; reports of earlier affected versions should include the exact version and reproduction details.",
"id": "GHSA-gvp8-978c-rx2q",
"modified": "2026-09-30T23:53:17Z",
"published": "2026-09-30T23:53:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-gvp8-978c-rx2q"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/0c87c8c8b1a74cac99ad8115f3050efcb7fbed35"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PyJWT.decode() reintroduces options-dict mutation, enabling silent claim-verification bypass on dict reuse"
}
Sightings
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