GHSA-GV8P-48FR-4FXG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-04 19:23 – Updated: 2026-06-04 19:23Summary
A non-admin API user with integration:create ACL privilege can escalate to full administrator by creating an integration with admin: true through the Sync API (POST /api/_action/sync). The regular integration endpoint (POST /api/integration) correctly blocks this, but the Sync API bypasses the controller-level check by writing directly through the DAL EntityWriter. The integration entity definition lacks WriteProtection, and the admin field has no field-level restriction flag.
OWASP: A01:2021 — Broken Access Control
Root Cause
IntegrationController::upsertIntegration() checks $source->isAdmin() before allowing the admin field to be set. However, SyncController::sync() routes writes through SyncService → EntityWriter, which only applies:
AclWriteValidator— checks entity-level ACL (integration:createis sufficient)EntityProtectionValidator— checksWriteProtectionon entity definitions, butIntegrationDefinitionhas none
The admin field in IntegrationDefinition is a plain BoolField with no WriteProtection or special flag. The Sync API writes it without restriction.
Vulnerable code path:
- src/Core/Framework/Api/Controller/SyncController.php → SyncService → EntityWriter::upsert()
- Missing protection: src/Core/Framework/Integration/IntegrationDefinition.php — admin field has no WriteProtection(Context::SYSTEM_SCOPE)
Working protection (bypassed):
- src/Core/Framework/Integration/IntegrationController.php:46-56 — isAdmin() check only applies to the dedicated controller endpoint
Impact
- Complete admin API access — the escalated integration has full read/write on every entity: users, customers, orders, system configuration, integrations, plugins
- PII exfiltration — read all customer records (names, emails, addresses, order history)
- Persistent backdoor — the admin integration survives password changes and user deactivation
Remediation
Add WriteProtection(Context::SYSTEM_SCOPE) to IntegrationDefinition, matching how UserDefinition and AclRoleDefinition are already protected:
// src/Core/Framework/Integration/IntegrationDefinition.php
(new BoolField('admin', 'admin'))
->addFlags(new WriteProtection(Context::SYSTEM_SCOPE)),
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "shopware/platform"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.7.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "shopware/platform"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.10.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "shopware/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.7.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "shopware/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.10.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48008"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-04T19:23:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA non-admin API user with `integration:create` ACL privilege can escalate to full administrator by creating an integration with `admin: true` through the Sync API (`POST /api/_action/sync`). The regular integration endpoint (`POST /api/integration`) correctly blocks this, but the Sync API bypasses the controller-level check by writing directly through the DAL EntityWriter. The `integration` entity definition lacks `WriteProtection`, and the `admin` field has no field-level restriction flag.\n\n**OWASP:** A01:2021 \u2014 Broken Access Control\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`IntegrationController::upsertIntegration()` checks `$source-\u003eisAdmin()` before allowing the `admin` field to be set. However, `SyncController::sync()` routes writes through `SyncService \u2192 EntityWriter`, which only applies:\n\n1. `AclWriteValidator` \u2014 checks entity-level ACL (`integration:create` is sufficient)\n2. `EntityProtectionValidator` \u2014 checks `WriteProtection` on entity definitions, but `IntegrationDefinition` has none\n\nThe `admin` field in `IntegrationDefinition` is a plain `BoolField` with no `WriteProtection` or special flag. The Sync API writes it without restriction.\n\n**Vulnerable code path:**\n- `src/Core/Framework/Api/Controller/SyncController.php` \u2192 `SyncService` \u2192 `EntityWriter::upsert()`\n- **Missing protection:** `src/Core/Framework/Integration/IntegrationDefinition.php` \u2014 `admin` field has no `WriteProtection(Context::SYSTEM_SCOPE)`\n\n**Working protection (bypassed):**\n- `src/Core/Framework/Integration/IntegrationController.php:46-56` \u2014 `isAdmin()` check only applies to the dedicated controller endpoint\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Complete admin API access** \u2014 the escalated integration has full read/write on every entity: users, customers, orders, system configuration, integrations, plugins\n- **PII exfiltration** \u2014 read all customer records (names, emails, addresses, order history)\n- **Persistent backdoor** \u2014 the admin integration survives password changes and user deactivation\n\n## Remediation\n\nAdd `WriteProtection(Context::SYSTEM_SCOPE)` to `IntegrationDefinition`, matching how `UserDefinition` and `AclRoleDefinition` are already protected:\n\n```php\n// src/Core/Framework/Integration/IntegrationDefinition.php\n(new BoolField(\u0027admin\u0027, \u0027admin\u0027))\n -\u003eaddFlags(new WriteProtection(Context::SYSTEM_SCOPE)),\n```",
"id": "GHSA-gv8p-48fr-4fxg",
"modified": "2026-06-04T19:23:33Z",
"published": "2026-06-04T19:23:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/shopware/shopware/security/advisories/GHSA-gv8p-48fr-4fxg"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/shopware/shopware"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/shopware/shopware/releases/tag/v6.6.10.18"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/shopware/shopware/releases/tag/v6.7.10.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Shopware: Privilege Escalation via Sync API Integration Admin Flag Bypass"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.