GHSA-GV2Q-MQQV-365M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 16:44 – Updated: 2026-07-15 22:05An issue in the @angular/service-worker package compromises the integrity of request-policy enforcement during request reconstruction. When the Angular Service Worker intercepts network requests for matched assets, it reconstructs a new Request object using an internal helper function.
During this reconstruction process, the helper function strips the strict, client-defined request redirect policy configuration (such as redirect: 'error'), falling back to the browser's default 'follow' strategy.
If the target web application makes client-side requests with a strict policy (e.g., expecting a network error instead of automatically following redirects), the service worker will bypass this instruction and automatically follow HTTP 3xx redirects to other destinations. This acts as an unintended proxy/intermediary ("Confused Deputy") and can result in cookie/credential exposure or same-origin session-restricted data leakage if public dynamic routes redirect to sensitive routes.
Impact
Web applications registering the @angular/service-worker package are vulnerable to this redirect-policy bypass if they make safe client-side fetch calls (such as { redirect: 'error' }) to paths matched by a service worker asset group (such as lazy-loaded JavaScript bundles or dynamic public assets) that can return HTTP redirects to authenticated same-origin secure endpoints.
By stripping developer-defined safety boundaries, the service worker allows the browser to transparently query and return data from credentials-guarded resources that should have been blocked at the network barrier.
Attack Preconditions
To successfully exploit this vulnerability, all of the following application states and parameters must concurrently exist:
1. Active Angular Service Worker: The target application uses @angular/service-worker and has an active registration of ngsw-worker.js inside the client's browser context.
2. Asset Group Matching: An assetGroups pattern in ngsw-config.json encompasses the target dynamic routing endpoint.
3. Same-Origin Dynamic Redirection: The server routes a public matched asset route to a service that returns an HTTP 3xx redirect pointing to a sensitive, session-restricted same-origin private route (e.g., /private/account-summary.json).
4. Established User Session: The victim user currently has an active authentication state, such as valid same-origin session cookies or auth headers stored by the browser.
5. Client-Side Safe Fetch Call: The application initiates an explicit fetch request to the route with safety parameters: { redirect: 'error' }.
Mitigations & Workarounds
If upgrading the @angular/service-worker package is not immediately feasible, developers should implement the following defensive measures:
* Avoid Public-to-Private Dynamic Redirection: Refactor the server architecture so that public paths matched by service worker asset groups never issue HTTP 3xx redirects to authenticated same-origin secure endpoints.
* Strict Cookie Configuration: Apply strict flags to session cookies (SameSite=Strict; Secure; HttpOnly) and consider explicit route isolations (such as subdomains) for credential-guarded private resources.
* Exclude Secure Endpoints from SW Config: Verify your ngsw-config.json settings and ensure that patterns targeting dynamic, secure endpoints are explicitly excluded from automatic asset groups or caching scopes.
Patches
- 22.0.0-rc.2
- 21.2.15
- 20.3.22
- 19.2.23
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/service-worker"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "22.0.0-next.0"
},
{
"fixed": "22.0.0-rc.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/service-worker"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "20.0.0-next.0"
},
{
"fixed": "20.3.22"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/service-worker"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "19.0.0-next.0"
},
{
"fixed": "19.2.23"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/service-worker"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "18.2.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@angular/service-worker"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "21.0.0-next.0"
},
{
"fixed": "21.2.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-50169"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-441",
"CWE-524"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T16:44:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T18:16:42Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue in the `@angular/service-worker` package compromises the integrity of request-policy enforcement during request reconstruction. When the Angular Service Worker intercepts network requests for matched assets, it reconstructs a new `Request` object using an internal helper function. \n\nDuring this reconstruction process, the helper function strips the strict, client-defined request redirect policy configuration (such as `redirect: \u0027error\u0027`), falling back to the browser\u0027s default `\u0027follow\u0027` strategy.\n\nIf the target web application makes client-side requests with a strict policy (e.g., expecting a network error instead of automatically following redirects), the service worker will bypass this instruction and automatically follow HTTP 3xx redirects to other destinations. This acts as an unintended proxy/intermediary (\"Confused Deputy\") and can result in cookie/credential exposure or same-origin session-restricted data leakage if public dynamic routes redirect to sensitive routes.\n\n### Impact\nWeb applications registering the `@angular/service-worker` package are vulnerable to this redirect-policy bypass if they make safe client-side fetch calls (such as `{ redirect: \u0027error\u0027 }`) to paths matched by a service worker asset group (such as lazy-loaded JavaScript bundles or dynamic public assets) that can return HTTP redirects to authenticated same-origin secure endpoints. \n\nBy stripping developer-defined safety boundaries, the service worker allows the browser to transparently query and return data from credentials-guarded resources that should have been blocked at the network barrier.\n\n### Attack Preconditions\nTo successfully exploit this vulnerability, all of the following application states and parameters must concurrently exist:\n1. **Active Angular Service Worker:** The target application uses `@angular/service-worker` and has an active registration of `ngsw-worker.js` inside the client\u0027s browser context.\n2. **Asset Group Matching:** An `assetGroups` pattern in `ngsw-config.json` encompasses the target dynamic routing endpoint.\n3. **Same-Origin Dynamic Redirection:** The server routes a public matched asset route to a service that returns an HTTP 3xx redirect pointing to a sensitive, session-restricted same-origin private route (e.g., `/private/account-summary.json`).\n4. **Established User Session:** The victim user currently has an active authentication state, such as valid same-origin session cookies or auth headers stored by the browser.\n5. **Client-Side Safe Fetch Call:** The application initiates an explicit fetch request to the route with safety parameters: `{ redirect: \u0027error\u0027 }`.\n\n### Mitigations \u0026 Workarounds\nIf upgrading the `@angular/service-worker` package is not immediately feasible, developers should implement the following defensive measures:\n* **Avoid Public-to-Private Dynamic Redirection:** Refactor the server architecture so that public paths matched by service worker asset groups never issue HTTP 3xx redirects to authenticated same-origin secure endpoints.\n* **Strict Cookie Configuration:** Apply strict flags to session cookies (`SameSite=Strict; Secure; HttpOnly`) and consider explicit route isolations (such as subdomains) for credential-guarded private resources.\n* **Exclude Secure Endpoints from SW Config:** Verify your `ngsw-config.json` settings and ensure that patterns targeting dynamic, secure endpoints are explicitly excluded from automatic asset groups or caching scopes.\n\n### Patches\n- 22.0.0-rc.2\n- 21.2.15\n- 20.3.22\n- 19.2.23",
"id": "GHSA-gv2q-mqqv-365m",
"modified": "2026-07-15T22:05:03Z",
"published": "2026-06-15T16:44:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-gv2q-mqqv-365m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50169"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/67494"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Angular Service Worker Policy-Bypass \u0026 Credential-Stripping Vulnerabilities"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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